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INTRODUCTION: ARE LAWYERS A PRINCIPLED "ARISTOCRACY" OR
"BLOOD-SUCKING LEECHES"?

We lawyers like to think of ourselves as principled people defending
the spirit and institutions of the Rule of Law. De Tocqueville, in his classic
Democracy in America, described lawyers as the American aristocracy.'
Unfortunately, to the extent it exists, that aristocracy has become much like
the corrupt and abusive French version of the species, one that led to the
French Revolution and the overthrow of the Ancien Regime.2
1.

1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 278 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,

1945) ("In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to mistrust the
wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class and the most cultivated portion of society . . . . If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply

without hesitation that it is not among the rich, who are united by no common tie, but that it
occupies the judicial bench and the bar.").
2. The most prestigious lawyers in the largest and most elite law firms arguably fit
into the category that French philosopher Jacques Ellul described as the "servants of technique" with the firms and their extremely powerful clients being the institutions through
which Ellul's "technological society" operates. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL

SOCIETY 349 (1964). In such a system we see the institution in control of the individual ra-
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At this point in American history, lawyers seem to be the only ones
who think well of their profession. At least in terms of the public's perception, lawyers are greedy, "asset sucking" parasites feeding off clients rather
than serving them with diligence and faithfulness. In one cartoon, for example, a patient is sitting on the edge of a doctor's examining table with the
physician standing thoughtfully behind him. On the patient's back is an ugly
gnome-like creature-complete with miniature suit and briefcase. Its teeth
and claws are dug into the patient's back. The doctor offers the following
diagnosis: "I can see what's causing the problem-you've got a lawyer on
your back."' In another cartoon two women are sharing coffee, and one remarks: "It's finally over-Frank's lawyer got the apartment, and my lawyer
got our two cars and the beach house."'
Although I am arguing that the situation involving poor and unethical
professional service is becoming worse due to economic pressures and an
oversupply of lawyers relative to paying clients, it would be naive to suggest there ever was a golden age in which the bar was uniformly comprised
of highly principled lawyers.' We need only think back to Dickens' Bleak
House with its dismaying ending after years of hearings and litigation in the
Court of Chancery over a rich potential inheritance.' The case of Jarndyce
and Jarndyce came to its final anticlimactic end with the "good news/bad
news" ruling by the court proclaiming that a long time claimant had in fact
won. Unfortunately this was followed by the pronouncement that there was
no corpus left in the estate because it had been eaten up by costs and legal
fees. The court had received its portion of the fees over years of protracted
litigation. Hordes of lawyers had sustained their law practices on the aspirations of potential heirs encouraged to overestimate the likelihood of their
ther than an existentialist triumph of the principled person. Ellul observes that in a society
dominated by large institutions: "The intelligentsia will no longer be a model, a conscience,
or an animating intellectual spirit . . .. They will be the servants, the most conformist imaginable, of the instruments of technique." Id.
3.
LAWYERS! LAWYERS! LAWYERS!: A CARTOON COLLECTION 1 (Samuel Gross ed.,
1994).
4. Id at 11. We rationalize and deny the amoral nature of our behavior. ABRAHAM
MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 66 (2d ed. 1968). Maslow describes human selfdeception as being a flight from knowledge that would otherwise cause us to face ourselves

honestly. Id. He explains: "We tend to be afraid of any knowledge that could cause us to
despise ourselves or to make us feel inferior, weak, worthless, evil, shameful." Id.
5. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia,
100 DICK. L. REv. 549 (1996), for the idea that we tend to overstate the historical virtues of
lawyers. A leading American scholar on legal ethics and professionalism, Thomas Morgan,
has described the trends and conditions affecting the U.S. legal profession and challenged its
right to continue any claim to that privileged status. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE
VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 19-70 (2010).

6. David Perdue, David Perdue's Charles Dickens Page-Bleak House,
http://charlesdickenspage.com/bleakhouse.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) (citing CHARLES
DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1852-1853)).
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chances. Those hopeful heirs had been in many instances rendered bankrupt
as they exhausted their resources and borrowed money to finance the fees,
and once the carcass had been stripped of all sustenance, the judge was
somehow able to reach a decision after years of dithering and delay.
Private law practice has always been a business, but the rules of ethics
and lawyers' espoused principles sought to add a special element that made
what lawyers do something more than a business-something that Judge
William Hoevelar described as a "sacred trust."7 The undeniable fact is that
regardless of elevated rhetoric the private practice of law is a business and,
for too many lawyers, nothing but a business.! There has been an almost
complete commercialization of the private sector of the legal profession.'
The primary aim of the private law business is to extract the maximum economic benefit from the available assets (clients) with the greatest efficiency
and at the least cost to the business in terms of financial expenditure by the
lawyer and efficient use of time to maximize earnings.o The problem with
the reality of law practice is that it arrogates to itself the terms of ethical
regulation and has erected barriers to civil liability that make it extremely
difficult for wronged clients to identify their lawyers' deficiencies and recover compensation for unprofessional and incompetent representation.
At this point we need to abandon rhetoric about what we wish the legal profession to be and become realistic about what it actually is, who we
are, and how we behave. The "bottom line" should be one understood and
accepted by lawyers who run their law practices as a business. This means
that lawyers are engaged in a business for profit and need to be regulated
and treated as such. Yet many lawyers are caught in the confusion between
idealized professionalism and the rigors of business. One consequence is
that lawyers operate under assumptions that on the one hand allow them to
disassociate the price of their services from the quality and degree of suc7. "Men and women entering the practice of law undertake an important trust, a
trust that involves the care of other people's lives, their money, their fortunes and their futures. That's why we are required to take an oath, because we are undertaking this sacred
trust." Professionalism in Practice,A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 48, 50 (quoting Judge William
M. Hoevelar).
8. See, e.g., Frederick L. Trilling, The Strategic Application ofBusiness Methods to
the PracticeofLaw, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 13, 17-18 (1998).
9. See David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces to
Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practicefor Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
203 (2004). For some thoughts on the direct impact of economic trends on law practice see
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between
Law School and Law Practice,64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1991); Vincent R. Johnson & Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 359 (1990); F. Bentley Mooney, Jr., How to Triple Your
Effective Hourly Billing Rates, 15 A.B.A J. LEGAL ECON., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 32; Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Many Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45 S.C. L. REV. 905 (1994).
10.
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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cess and on the other fail to comprehend important trends and technological
changes that are altering dramatically the conditions of competition and the
ways in which successful "law businesses" must work." There is a need to
create a comprehensive system of regulation through civil law rather than
aspiration and voluntary pledges the violation of which is subject to few if
any sanctions and virtually no actual accountability. 2 It is simply not useful
to think of attorneys in private practice in any other way because when we
do we perpetuate our stay in a non-existent dimension bordering on The
Twilight Zone.
The state of the legal profession is embarrassing. The client has become an object for far too many lawyers, a monetizable asset to be used and
11. William C. Cobb, WCCI: The Toxic Ten Assumptions of the Legal Profession,
WCCI, INC., http://www.cobb-consulting.com/doctoxic.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2003).
Cobb, a management consultant to law firms, lists the "toxic ten" as follows:
1. Effort is equal to value. The number of billable hours is a primary driver of
profitability.
2. Consumers will always need lawyers to interpret the law. Lawyers have a monopoly on the interpretation of the law.
3. The lawyer, as a supplier, determines what is value added service. Not the client.
4. Leverage of other lawyers is the key to law firm profitability.
5. Young lawyers want to work for law firms and become owners.
6. The practice of law is a profession and not a business.
7. The quality of legal services is based upon the experience and expertise of the
lawyer.
8. The needs of the market have nothing to do with the strategy and structure for
the delivery of legal services. The lawyers define the structure for the delivery of
legal services.
9. What lawyers have done in the past is the practice of law.
10. The practice of law will always be regulated by the courts.
Id.
12. An interesting approach is found in HALT'S 2002 Lawyer Discipline Report
Card. Halt-Lawyer Accountability, HALT, http://www.halt.org/reformprojects/lawyer
accountability/report card/summaryof findings.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). HALT's
2002 Lawyer Discipline Report Card:
reveals a system of self-regulation that is badly broken and in need of urgent reform. If an attorney discipline agency in this country imposes any discipline, more
often than not it takes the form of a minor secretly dispensed reprimand. While
some jurisdictions are beginning to make their disciplinary services better known
to the public, many states remain hopelessly stranded in the dark ages, without
websites or listings in local telephone directories. Agencies deprive consumers of
basic information about their lawyer's discipline history. In many states, disciplinary hearings are held in secret and a few jurisdictions forbid even the person who
filed the complaint to attend. Many consumers fear that if they submit grievances,
their lawyers may sue them, and when individuals do have the courage to file a
complaint, state "gag rules" punish them with fines and imprisonment if they speak
about the grievance. State agencies delay filing formal charges against attorneys
and if a hearing regarding a lawyer's ethical violations does occur, the judge and
jury consists of fellow lawyers.
Id.
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sucked dry of resources for the lawyers' ends for reasons having nothing to
do with the duty of service to the client and the client's best interests. 3 Clients are fungible commodities from which lawyers extract as much revenue
as possible regardless of client interests, needs, or welfare. This is an obvious violation of the oft-proclaimed values represented by the roles of counselor and advocate on which we ground ethical claims and proclaim our
right to self-regulate. The point argued here is that lawyers have betrayed
their clients, are incapable of self-regulation, and that an entirely new system of civil accountability needs to be put in place that is not wholly controlled by the bench and bar.' 4
PART 1: TELLING THE STORY OF LAWYERS' "ETHICS" THROUGH EXAMPLES

My position about abandoning the system of legal ethics and substituting a new civil accountability system to better protect clients is not the result of a theoretical academic critique. Based on a diverse professional experience, years of teaching, consulting and research, it is clear that lawyers
fail clients on a regular basis and that in most instances the client is unaware
of what has occurred. Even if aware, the ordinary client has no real recourse
against his or her former lawyer. One element of the failure is that in many
instances clients never fully understand what the case is about, what it will
cost over time, or what its positive or negative economic value will be. Nor
are they educated about the outcome probabilities. They retain a lawyer, and
in doing so have little choice but to trust in the lawyer's presumed professionalism. As suggested in the examples that follow, too often that trust is
betrayed."

13.

For wide-ranging analysis of the decline in the integrity of the legal profession,

see

RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES (2008); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993); SOL M. LINOwITz & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION:
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of

an HonorableProfession,71 IND. L.J. 911 (1996).
14. A year 2000 report by the American Bar Association (ABA) analyzed the rates
of lawyer discipline on a state-by-state basis. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYER Disc., ABA,
2000 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2000). Arkansas imposed sanctions of some

sort on slightly less than two percent of its lawyer population in 2000 while Ohio trailed the
field with sanctions on only 0.13 percent of the practicing bar, a total of 50 sanctions on a
lawyer population of 38,549. Id. at 10-34. Other examples are Pennsylvania 0.26 percent,
Washington, D.C. 0.19 percent, and California 0.45 percent. Id.
15. Many lawyers are attempting to insulate themselves from client lawsuits against
them for unsatisfactory performance. See Lawyers Hide From Lawsuits, NEWSMAX.COM,
December 1, 2000, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2000/11/30/205206.shtml.
The article states:
Lawyers are quick to sue almost anyone except other lawyers, a lawyers' publication says.

Abandoning an "Unethical" System ofLegal Ethics

353

With these considerations in mind, the following examples are offered
to provide a sense of just how brutal and unprofessional the private practice
of law can be. Among lawyers' main assets are their time, quality of experience, and knowledge. The problem is that time is finite and can be made
elastic only to a limited extent by legitimate means. The ideal of high quality client representation assumes, however, that lawyers will be able to devote the necessary energy and time to the client's needs required to produce
the best outcomes. The reality is considerably different. Far too often lawyers lack the skills, values, and principles to actually fulfill their professional and ethical responsibilities. This means that such lawyers "muddle
through" cases and transactions with failures to do needed things due to lack
of experience or knowledge as well as billing for unnecessary or shoddy
work for which clients are charged while receiving no benefit.
But while lack of skills and knowledge cause professional shortcomings, even when lawyers possess the skills and knowledge essential for
competent representation, they often fail to apply them to the dispute or
transaction due to time conflicts, costs, and the demands of cases being
handled for other clients. While for clients the dispute or transaction for
which they seek representation is of paramount importance, for the lawyer it
is only one item in a bundle of legal matters for which he or she has accepted responsibility. Considerations of cost, available time, competing demands, and the like will often mean that the lawyer fails to properly or fully
evaluate the case or take action of a kind that increases the probability of a
positive outcome for the client.
While incompetence and neglect therefore present one set of issues, in
an unfortunate number of instances even skilled lawyers act in ways that
disserve their clients by incurring needless costs that work to the attorney's
financial benefit through higher fees. The tension is caused by the fact that
lawyers are in business and need the fees provided by clients to operate that
business. This requires that the lawyer be able to "sell" prospective clients
Lawyers Weekly USA reported Thursday that a growing number of lawyers
are putting fine print in fee agreements shielding them from being sued by a client
if they botch a case.
The national newspaper for small law firms said lawyers instead prefer that
such disputes go to private arbitration because arbitration is faster and cheaper, decisions are often made by other lawyers rather than juries, and there's no public
record.
Such "arbitration clauses" have raised questions of ethics and have themselves
become the subject of litigation in some states.
"The growing practice of lawyers of preventing themselves from being sued
by a client for negligence raises some serious ethical questions," said Thomas F.
Harrison, publisher of the weekly newspaper and its Web site.
"It is certainly ironic that some would take away this right from their clients."
Id.
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on the services to be provided. As in any sale of products or services, there
is a clear difference between the lawyer's persuasion of the potential consumer of legal services to agree to buy the services and the actual provision
of the promised services. At the stage in which the lawyer is attempting to
persuade the potential consumer of legal services to enter into an agreement
to buy the services, the lawyer is operating as a seller, just as is so with any
other purveyor of goods or services.
If a lawyer feels there is a reasonably viable case, he or she becomes a
"sales person." This includes seeking to close the deal so that the potential
"asset" does not walk out the door to work out a deal with another lawyer.
This will cause lawyers at the initial "sales" phase of the client-acquisition
interaction to overstate the potential outcomes that can be achieved and understate the costs and risks of achieving the clients' goals. Many lawyers
inevitably fall prey to the human tendency to paint a rosier picture than
might be justified.
Fees and expenses are a critical part of evaluating the realistic outcome potential of a case, as opposed to abstract possibilities of what might
be obtained under a best-case scenario. The reality should be explained to
clients in clear and down-to-earth language, but lawyers who are attempting
to convince a client to sign up with them understandably do not want to
scare off clients who represent thousands of dollars in billable hours or potentially lucrative contingent fees. Many lawyers therefore have a tendency
to be vague or misleading about the real costs of their services or the probability of a favorable outcome.
The other part of the sales pitch is that the lawyer's ability to help may
be overstated to "hook" the client into buying legal services from the lawyer. Where a client has money to pay fees or the case is one in which it is
highly probable that some money will be forthcoming because of insurance
or some other source of revenue, lawyers have an unconscious incentive to
overstate the beneficial outcomes they can achieve for their clients because
there is a guaranteed source for their fee.
There are economies of scale depending on the size of the practice, the
types and diversity of cases being handled, the lawyer's experience, the
quality of support staff, and other demands made on the lawyer's time."
The economies of scale tend to be less available to solo practitioners and
lawyers operating in micro-firm contexts, although even as the scale of the
operation increases with firm size and resources, there is no guarantee that
16. Technology and innovation are altering the economy of scale efficiencies for
some newer "tech-savvy" graduates who are using technology and the Internet to drastically
reduce the costs of running a law office even to the extent of establishing a "virtual office."
See, e.g., the example presented in Anika Anand, Law Grads Going Solo and Loving It,
MSNBC.coM, June 20, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43442917/ns/businesscareers/t/law-grads-going-solo-loving-it/.
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the quality of service rendered to clients improves because in many instances the improvements in operating efficiency are directed more toward maximizing the firm's profits than to improving client service."
A result of a lack of efficiencies due to inadequate scale and the need
to spread finite services across as many paying clients as can be obtained is
that each client's case receives less than optimal attention. This has a direct
impact on how the lawyer treats the cases in terms of assessing the value of
a positive resolution to the client contrasted with the value to the lawyer as
represented by the need to spread professional time across a range of clients.
The settlement value of cases being handled in such a milieu are more likely
to be influenced by considerations that tend to protect the lawyer's business
needs rather than achieving the best outcome for clients. Similarly, in many
instances the intensity and thoroughness of case preparation for trial is considerably below what might be considered the best professional standard.
For these reasons the ideal paradigm of how a client's case should be handled is an impossible dream for most cases and clients as well as lawyers."
17.
Solo and small-scale law firm practitioners are disproportionately sanctioned for
professional violations relative to their counterparts in larger firms. A study by the California
State Bar, for example, revealed that ninety-five percent of the investigations opened by the
Bar (and ninety-eight percent of completed cases) were aimed at solo and small firm (fewer
than ten) lawyers even though lawyers in those categories were only fifty-six percent of the
lawyer population. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATTORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL LAW FIRMS AND

LARGE
SIZE
LAW
FIRMS
7
(June
2001),
available
at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket--OydXJk36ys4%3D&tabid=224&mid= 1
534.
18. A brief but powerful description is offered in Matt Brown, Managing Caseload,
Aug. 8, 2011, http://brownandlittlelaw.com/2011/08/08/managing-caseload/. As a young
lawyer Brown contacted a number of lawyers in order to determine what kind of caseload
was optimal and consistent with reasonable earnings and professional quality. Id. He relates
some frightening information:
I also spoke with lawyers who built their practices around court-appointed clients and only occasionally took a private client. For the most part, they blew the
public defenders away as far as numbers go. One lady bragged to me about having
400 appointments in one year alone, some of which were capital cases. I was extremely disturbed, and believe it or not, that isn't the highest number I've heard. A
month or two ago, I contacted a court-appointed lawyer before taking over a case
from him. He was irked that I called and wasted his time, and he informed me that
he had no clue who the client was anyway because he has 1200 different clients on
his caseload.
Public defenders and turn-and-burn contract lawyers weren't the place to
look, but the people who had my dream practice were no better as a guide. They
had very few clients, but they were all bigger cases. If I'd have taken so few clients, I'd have starved with the types of cases I did in the beginning. On top of that,
they handled the kinds of cases I had no business touching fresh out of law school.
Without any perfect example to follow, I did my best to set limits on my caseload
and hoped that one day I'd be busy enough to worry about that kind of thing.
Id.
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The only situations in which something akin to total devotion and preparation is possible is with very deep pocket clients (generally large corporations) in high-stakes disputes, or government lawyers in a well staffed agency capable of devoting the necessary time, resources, and staff to the conflict. This still does not guarantee quality of service but increases the likelihood that it will occur.
A. Case # 1: "Playing" with a Dispute Until Fees Are Maximized
An example of the chasm between wishing how lawyers and clients
behaved and their actual behavior is provided by a lawyer who sent me a
note in response to an article I wrote about professionalism. He explained
that in a case where he was co-lead counsel for plaintiffs in a bus accident in
which twenty-two people died and twenty-one were injured that:
We tried early on to get the various defendants interested in settlements, but it
quickly became clear that they were more interested in doing everything possible
to avoid settlement, so they could milk the case for as much as they could. By the
time my involvement ended, the three major defense firms involved had probably
billed something in the neighborhood of $2.0 million each [$6 million total] to
their clients.19

Such profit-seeking behavior dominates the examples provided here and
takes many guises depending on the nature of the case and the available
resources the client brings into the representation.
It is not uncommon for lawyers to drag out cases well beyond what is
necessary in order to collect high fees through maximization of billable
hours. This tendency is widespread. 21 I consulted on a federal court case in
Wyoming against a prosecutor in which the State had allocated funds to pay
the fees of the prosecutor's lawyers. While there were hints related to several low-ball offers during depositions, I suggested to the plaintiffs lawyers
that nothing would be of much consequence until the prosecutor's attorneys
had worked their way through the state's authorized fee for their work.
When the point was reached where the lawyers would have to begin serious
preparation for the twice rescheduled trial, an offer appeared that was two
and a half times what had been suggested earlier. The case was promptly
settled.
19.
20.

Charles Colvin letter to author 1 (November 18, 2003) (on file with author).
For an exposure of abusive billing practices among some large corporate firms,

see RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE

PERVERSION OF JUSTICE INAMERICA 232-55 (1996) (Chapter 7, "The 'BUTS' Principle" [Bill

Until They Squawk]). Nader & Smith indicate that typical abuses include billing unworked
hours, senior partners billing at their high rate for the work of junior personnel, advising
clients not to accept settlements that are reasonable so the firm can keep billing, taking unnecessary depositions, and failing to provide detailed bills so the clients can't accurately
monitor what has been done. Id. at 239.

Abandoning an "Unethical" System ofLegal Ethics

357

B. Case # 2: "De-Legalizing" a Dispute and Considering the Human Costs
This approach is reflected in a situation where a trustee of a family
foundation derived from the trustee's sister's estate found herself responsible for pursuing the deceased sister's former husband for embezzlement of
approximately $90,000 in estate assets. A court had approved a settlement
and repayment plan, but the man was not honoring his agreement. A year
and a half was taken up with hearings seeking enforcement and sanctions,
broken promises, and lawyer fees. The trust's lawyer was quite willing to
keep pursuing the derelict and alcoholic former husband, and the legalities
of the situation were clear.
But the process was not only expensive from the perspective of the
lawyer's fees that were being drawn from the trust's corpus, it was also
causing the trustee, her sister's children, and family tremendous stress. The
former brother-in-law was sinking into depression, could not hold a job and
simply didn't care what effects his actions were having on his children or
the family. Or he was so deep into his addiction that he couldn't alter his
behavior. It was obvious that even if the funds were ultimately repaid it
would take years of expensive legal action involving repeated return to
court to enforce its orders. The trustee sought my counseling, and after a
process in which we laid out the goals, costs, and full range of financial and
human consequences, she decided to simply write off the remaining loss
and save legal fees that were likely to become as high as the amount owed
by the defendant. This removed the stresses on the children and family. In
essence the decision was made to "de-legalize" the dispute and give greater
weight to the human consequences of the conflict.
C. Case # 3: Stirring the "Pot" to Keep Controversy Going
The spirit of ethics and duties owed to clients faces significant obstacles in a profession where unfounded litigation and questionable claims and
assertions are supposed to be ethical violations. It takes an immoral person
to deliberately accuse another of reprehensible conduct that the accuser
knows the individual didn't do or about which the accuser has done no investigation in an effort to validate a client's claims against others. Such investigation in an effort to gain at least preliminary validation of the asserted
behavior is essential because the stresses of conflict often produce a psychological mindset in which clients are willing to claim facts exist that work to
their advantage. It is not enough for a lawyer to blindly accept whatever
claims a client asserts.2 1
21. See, e.g., Ex parte Gregory, 378 S.C. 430 (2008), in which an attorney filed suit
for conversion based solely on his client's assertion. Even though it does not happen often,
the case stands for the proposition that an attorney can possibly be sanctioned and required to
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One lesson I try to provide law students is that clients cannot be trusted to tell the truth. This reflects a variety of client "sins." Some clients intentionally fabricate in order to improve their leverage against an opponent
or to punish persons. Many exaggerate in order to strengthen their case.
Others simply reconstruct whatever happened in a way that rationalizes
their own behavior and puts it in a positive light while denigrating that of
others. One lawyer raises the problem of vile allegations among the divorce
bar, where there is a "popular perception that hot-button issues can drive a
spouse into submission. Child abuse. Incest. Adultery. Claims for all these
are on the rise, and they are often unfounded."22
Consider the likelihood that lawyers (and clients) who are willing to
accuse others of such terrible behavior can be expected to engage in good
faith negotiation and mediation in disputed contexts where there is little or
no authority to keep them in check. Lawyers who make baseless charges
knowingly, maliciously, or with reckless disregard of the truth of the allegations simply to gain an advantage are "scum" who should at least be suspended or disbarred in the most serious instances. While "all's fair in love
and war," there are ethical limits to such behavior in the practice of law. Of
course those "limits" appear highly ephemeral since there are surprisingly
few instances where lawyers have been sanctioned for reckless or intentional distortions of fact involving false allegations for which the attorney has
no factual basis or good faith reason to believe in the legitimacy of the assertions.23
Using such allegations imposes a heavy burden on those targeted and
can ruin reputations and lives. If a client is in the position of the targeted
person, how does he or she disprove an allegation of this sort that doesn't
depend on a single specific episode for which the accused may or may not
be fortunate enough to have an alibi? To the extent the assertions involve
alleged behavior that would have taken place in private venues, how does
pay legal fees and expenses for filing a frivolous claim if the attorney failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation into the facts. See also Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th
Cir. 1987), in which an attorney was held to be responsible to a third party who relied on an
opinion letter based on factual claims the lawyer did not investigate but for which he accepted the client's word. Although the good faith duty to investigate facts exists, such cases are
rare.
22. Kim Isaac Eisler, The Truth About Divorce Lawyers: It's Hard to Find Lawyers
Both Civilized and Fairto Clients Who Need a Divorce. Here's Why, WASHINGTONIAN, Oct.
1995, at 128.
23. In describing Washington D.C.'s top divorce lawyers, Eisler identified forty
lawyers considered to be the best at handling a divorce in an effective but civilized manner.
Id. It also described ten others, ones labeled "bombers" regarded as the best at what they do
and stating that: "What these ten others often do is torment the spouses of their clients. They *
sometimes are referred to as 'bombers' or 'sharks."' Id. "Bombers" and "sharks" also get
away with tormenting the opposing clients, in part because no one wants to take on the psychological stresses involved in dealing with these "legal terrorists."
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one respond to such accusations? Obviously charges that someone has engaged in vile behavior have foreseeable negative consequences as well as
operate as powerful sources of leverage for the accuser to the point that
even baseless allegations can bring the person to his or her knees and lead to
capitulation in negotiations.
Prior to a lawyer making assertions that an opposing party has engaged in reprehensible behavior, it is reasonable to ask what factual and
evidentiary support exists that entitles the attorney to make the accusation.
This raises the question of what are the threshold investigative responsibilities of a lawyer that should be required before making serious allegations of
corrupt and/or criminal behavior against another person. One approach that
might limit the behavior is to allow defamation and malicious prosecution
suits for situations in which such allegations can be shown to be reckless,
and to impose fines and civil liability on lawyers who assert ungrounded
claims for which they cannot provide legitimate evidence.
D. Case # 4: Failing to Anticipate Potential Disputes in Negotiating the Sate
of a Business
In designing transactions one of a lawyer's core responsibilities is figuring out how clients can achieve their personal and institutional objectives
with the least avoidable risk, and through non-adversarial, forward-looking
strategies. This approach can help to create a preventive strategy by designing a client's action plan together with identifying potential legal hot spots
that can be avoided or minimized with careful planning. This involves
avoiding risks by doing periodic legal checkups for on-going client situations in an effort to identify danger areas or uncover potential problems of
which the client may not be aware. Preventive law approaches can be very
important for clients.
Dispute resolution certainly involves the goals of dispute anticipation
and avoidance. The obligation of the lawyer as drafter and counselor is to
design transactions in ways that anticipate potential conflicts. This includes
ensuring that terms are crafted in ways so that reasonably predictable matters of disagreement over realistic eventualities that could impact the
agreement's functioning are taken into consideration in ways that avoid or
minimize their impact if they do occur.
The key to what might be termed "anticipatory" and "avoidance" dispute resolution is to identify potential disputes upfront and draft the transaction in a way that avoids or minimizes their existence or impact. A core
responsibility of lawyers is to ensure that there are not pitfalls and traps in
the agreements they negotiate for clients. This means that inconsistent conditions that create confusion or that work against their clients must be
avoided at all costs. In the sale of the business described below, there was a
failure to do this on multiple levels by the seller's attorney. The reason
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might have been that the negotiating lawyer lacked the experience or intelligence to understand how businesses function or know where there was a
greater likelihood of breach or conflict.
Negotiating a complex business transaction requires a significant
range of knowledge cutting across numerous areas of law. Many lawyers
could be acting in complete good faith in terms of their intention to help the
client but lack the experience to understand the processes sufficiently to
know what is needed to protect their clients. It is not bad faith, but incompetence. Other lawyers, and this was most likely the situation in the sale of a
business example described below, are working within a firm where there
are sufficient resources and a mix of experience such that the knowledge
does exist but for some reason was not applied to a particular transaction. In
such situations the client, as here, pays tens of thousands of dollars only to
receive poor service from the lawyers responsible for protecting his rights.
This client paid the fees, was represented negligently and inadequately, and
suffered significant financial loss including salary, additional legal fees, and
loss of the value of the deal involving the sale of the business.
This is where the lawyer's job as counselor comes into play in the
transactional realm. It should be clear from this example that the function of
counselor involves a diverse array of knowledge. The knowledge is not only
about the technical elements of law in a variety of complex areas including
contracts, tax, non-compete provisions, financial recourse, and other matters, but the practical considerations and dynamics of the context within
which one is operating. A lawyer negotiating agreements involving business
relationships must have sufficient experience to understand the conditions
and dynamics of the business world in the area in which the agreements are
being negotiated. If a lawyer lacks that knowledge or fails to apply it in a
specific transaction, then the client is put at risk because the terms of the
agreement are being defined in a vacuum without context. If the other party's lawyer understands such nuances, then that person may be able to craft
the transaction in a way that allows his lawyer to take advantage of the deficient or negligent lawyer's client-as occurred in this example.
An example of a failure to take this approach was brought to me in the
context of an agreement involving the sale of a business, the conditions of
continuing employment of the selling owner, and two incompatible noncompete clauses in the agreement to sell and the continuing employment
contract. The seller's lawyer clearly didn't bother to understand or explain
to his client the real import of the inconsistent provisions. Nor did the lawyer identify or counsel the client on the fact that the conditions of employment could be manipulated by the buyer to justify the seller's discharge
based on factors completely outside the control of the seller as a continuing
employee of the new owner.
The result was that after one year, the seller's employment was not only terminated without notice, but the buyer asserted the primacy of the non-
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compete provision contained in the agreement of sale over the contract for
employment. The seller's lawyers who had drafted and negotiated the
agreements for sale of the business and continuing employment "stonewalled" their former client (seller) on the issue of their numerous oversights
and sloppiness even though the agreements were replete with other examples of the lawyers' negligence and incompetence. These included a buyer's
liability provision that placed liability for any breach solely in a newly created corporation whose assets were limited to only those of the purchased
entity. It also subordinated the seller's right to continuing payments for the
sale through a complicated mishmash of superficially ambiguous terms.
Properly understood, it all meant that the seller faced the real possibility of
never receiving full compensation for the sale of the business. In fact that is
exactly what happened.
Ironically, if we analyze this situation from the perspective of the opposing client and its lawyers, there are several insights that can be obtained,
and they do not bode well for the "moral" dimension of law practice or dispute resolution where lawyers are supposed to be pure of heart and not take
advantage of others' ignorance or vulnerabilities-including that of the other party's incompetent lawyers. From the perspective of the buyer of the
business in this example, the agreements that were signed basically obtained
the business for almost nothing.
Any financial obligation was essentially being funded by a leveragedbuyout in which the revenues from the acquired business were used to meet
any obligation to the seller. If those revenues for any reason became inadequate, including failures on the part of the buyer, the seller took the loss
while the buyer (who re-allocated some of the business to another corporate
entity) remained whole. Not only was the buyer's financial risk limited to
the revenues of the acquired business, the agreement contained language
subordinating the seller's right to payment for the sale to complex financial
arrangements the buyer negotiated separately with a bank.
One of the most indefensible aspects of the "deal" was that even if the
seller was terminated as an employee for no fault of his own, the inconsistent non-compete clauses created an uncertain situation in which the buyer appeared to have the power to prevent the seller from working in the
same industry for a period of three years even though terminated and even
though payments for purchase of the business had been suspended. Putting
aside the morality of the situation, the buyer essentially obtained a functioning business for free even though on paper the sale was for something above
$3 million.
Following his employment termination the seller attempted to meet
with the buyer without success, sought a waiver of the non-compete agreement, had difficulty obtaining employment in the industry due to the noncompete provision, and received no further payments for sale of the business due to alleged revenue shortfalls that appear to have been caused by
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asset transfers by the buyer to another of its corporate identities. Ultimately,
after research on the various issues the buyer was provided with an analysis
concerning the weakness of its non-compete provision under relevant state
law and the questionable and possibly bad faith actions it appears to have
taken to manipulate the businesses' revenues in ways that arguably violated
the sales and employment agreements. It backed off the non-compete provision and the seller gained other employment in the industry shortly thereafter.
E. Case # 5: Negotiating Oil and Gas Leases with the Clients' Interests at
Heart and for a Fair Fee
In Ohio, the state is encouraging the expansion of oil and gas well
drilling, including in state parks. There is also significant attention being
paid to leases for drilling in smaller farms in Southern Ohio since that area
has long demonstrated ample reserves. In several counties in Southeast
Ohio, lawyers are representing and seeking to represent small farmers in the
oil and gas leases of their farms. They are recruiting clients and recommending that they sign extremely complex long-term leases created by an
industry that is famous for one-sided dealing. There are several problems
with this, but among the most important are the lease price and the legal
import of the agreements, including tax and asset planning aimed at creating
maximum benefit for the farmers.
Added to this is the fact that at least some of the lawyers are charging
a two percent fee on the total lease amount rather than a reasonable hourly
rate that more accurately reflects the five or ten hours they may have put
into the transaction. Since the lawyers are not drafting the agreements supplied by the oil companies' lawyers and are mainly just recommending to
the lessors that they accept the contracts while spending relatively little time
on a matter that does not involve the risk of no return that underlies the justification for contingent fees, the use of a percentage fee arrangement appears unreasonable. If the lease amount spread over five years is $500,000
and the lawyer receives two percent, then the fee is $10,000 for five or ten
hours of no-risk work. This raises issues of whether the fee is reasonable
when looking at the time involved as well as the comparative results
achieved.
There are other questions raised by the fact that some lawyers appear
to be accepting a lease price per acre that is considerably lower than can be
obtained through actual negotiation with the potential lessee. One small
farmer with roughly 200 acres to lease was referred to a lawyer located out
of the county who specialized in oil and gas leases and agreed to handle the
matter for an hourly fee of $175. He negotiated a price per acre of $5,000,
150 percent higher than the norm of $2,000 per acre being recommended by
the local lawyers, along with a twenty percent royalty fee on production. He
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also offered recommendations on financial planning and income protection
for the lease payments and adjusted some terms of the proposed lease. This
demonstrates not only the effect of expertise in an area of specialized transactional law, but a sense of putting the client's interests at the heart of the
representation. Unfortunately one or both of these considerations is not always present in lawyers' representation of their clients.
F. Case # 6: Client Expectations and a Less Than Productive Mediation
Clients often do not understand how mediation works. In a case where
after twenty years of employment a college faculty member's renewable
three-year teaching contract was not renewed due to what he considered a
violation of his federal statutory rights relating to a physical disorder and a
failure by the college charged with the education of Roman Catholic priests
and the governing Catholic Diocese to make reasonable accommodations,
the dispute was submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The agency referred it to mediation. My role was mainly to
serve as a counselor since I was out of state. A local law firm was retained
to provide direct representation. The client was excited about the prospect
of mediation and the possibility of the year-old dispute finally being resolved since he had been reduced to doing odd jobs to earn money. An important concern was the client's expectation about the probability of what
would occur through mediation.
In attempting to bring the client "down to earth" about the likelihood
of a satisfactory mediation outcome, I communicated that he should not get
excited about the fact that the Diocese agreed to participate in the EEOC
mediation. I explained that this did not mean the Diocese was beginning to
take his claim seriously in the sense that the mediation would produce an
outcome of the kind he wanted. In many instances a party agrees to participate in mediation for reasons having nothing to do with an interest in settlement and that can in fact even be contrary to any desire to resolve the
dispute through mediation. These reasons include not wanting to seem unreasonable and to avoid alienating the authoritative decision maker (the
EEOC in this instance) because such an attitude could make the agency
decide the Diocese needs to be taught a lesson. Mediation can also be seen
as a time-consuming process that a party (usually the defendant) uses to
drive up the plaintiffs legal fees.24 They are counting on the fact that the
plaintiff isn't working full time at this point and likely needs money. It is all
part of a classic defense "siege" strategy of "softening up" the opposition by

24. On how these factors operate in strategic contexts involving the processes of
trial, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, see DAVID BARNHIZER, THE WARRIOR LAWYER:
POWERFUL STRATEGIES FOR WINNING LEGAL BATELES (1997).
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imposing greater costs and doing everything to drag out the case while the
claimant suffers more expenditures and losses.
The reasons opponents agree to participate in mediations also include
using the pretense of being interested in a possible settlement in order to
draw out the critical points of the opponent's case, and using the interaction
to send messages to the opponent about how they intend to approach the
case. Mediation can be used to send false messages to opponents about the
strengths or weaknesses of a case and can help to focus the opponent's lawyers on the key points they will have to deal with in arbitration or trial if
things reach that point. Mediation can be used to assess the opposing party
to determine how they might come across to subsequent fact finders.25
The point is that agreeing to mediation does not at all mean a party has
any interest in settling the case, certainly not at that point and perhaps not at
all. In this case the Diocese had some reason to reach a resolution. This includes protection of what is called the Ministerial Exception Doctrine because the factual situation involved is one in which they could fear that the
increasingly challenged Doctrine granting religious institutions a protected
status in hiring and firing decisions otherwise subject to federal and state
employment protection law could be narrowed further by courts.
In fact the application of the Ministerial Exception Doctrine has recently been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court.26 The Supreme Court recognized the application of the Doctrine on a relatively narrow set of facts in which the employee clearly held herself out as having
ministerial responsibilities and even received tax breaks based on that status, led prayer sessions, received lengthy instruction in ministerial duties,
and was "called" by the congregation. Those facts do not appear related to
this situation, and this leaves open the extent to which the Doctrine applies
in this particular case. Even with the Court upholding the Doctrine as it now
stands in a narrow sense, there is a significant factual dispute in this case
about whether the client had any employment duties of the kind that brings
him within the Doctrine's scope. Settling relatively early also includes the
avoidance of significant legal fees and costs that would have to be paid if
the case goes to court. This potentially includes its own expenses and the
plaintiffs fees if the Diocese were found to have violated the law on reasonable accommodation. While no one can know precisely what the costs
and fees would be in total, the Diocese should be thinking of an exposure as
high as $250,000 to $500,000 if this case were actually played out all the
way to the end through litigation.
The college's admission that the claimant was a fine teacher and that
his problems were related to infrequent tardiness on some administrative
25.
26.
(2012).

Id.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
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details undermines the defendant Diocese's position because an easy accommodation would have been to eliminate the administrative responsibilities as department chair and assign that role to another faculty member. Also, the timing of their actions creates a risk on their part that their actions
will be seen as bad faith and malicious, as is the offer to only provide the
claimant with a "neutral" letter of recommendation after two decades of
what they admitted in writing was excellent teaching. A "neutral" letter is
an obvious red flag and "kiss of death" for your possible future employment
as a teacher. This signifies a troubling type of malicious behavior that, after
I was made aware of it as their lawyer, I would have to tell them is pretty
creepy and capable of alienating a jury if it comes to that.
One of the reasons I cautioned the client about expecting any positive
resolution through mediation was that the lawyer for the Diocese had a reputation as being uncooperative and hard-nosed while "low-balling" cases
and seeing any concession on her part as weakness. She was also a staff
lawyer for the defendant Diocese and as such did not incur hourly fee costs
for her representation. In such a situation it appeared likely that her settlement authority was capped and that she took great pride in achieving relatively minimal settlements.
After several hours of presentation of positions and back and forth
discussions with the mediator, he indicated that he would support a
$100,000 settlement and that he would write his report to the parties and
EEOC within the next few days. He failed to do so and the Diocese's staff
lawyer indicated she would never go above $50,000. The troubling thing
was that the mediation program was based at a Catholic law school and,
oddly, no other mediators submitted an indication of interest prior to the
agency's choice of mediator. While the EEOC seemed to agree that there
might be a potential conflict of interest in this case, it took almost a year to
issue a finding that the situation involved the Ministerial Exception Doctrine in which an employee of a church whose duties were "ministerial"
rather than secular was not protected by federal statutes relating to discrimination in employment. Since the plaintiff simply taught a course in church
history at a Catholic seminary, this opinion appears pretty close to invalid
on its face. In any event, the general issue of the Ministerial Exception Doctrine's scope and application was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court albeit
in a narrow context, and this inserts an intriguing consideration into the ongoing controversy that is now in federal district court.27
This indicates there is clearly no magic in mediation. It can be productive when used well and in good faith but only in certain cases. In many
instances it simply increases attorney fees and costs to the disadvantage of
27.

Id.
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plaintiffs who have limited resources. In the above situation the Diocese
relied on a staff attorney while the claimant who no longer had a teaching
job paid an hourly fee to his lawyer that by the end of the mediation process
was $35,000 and quickly grew to more than $40,000. I had suggested
strongly from the beginning of the process that it would be necessary to file
suit in federal court because it was the only way to shift the handling of the
dispute away from staff counsel to expensive lawyers who would impose
considerably higher costs on the Diocese while bringing in an authoritative
source of decision making not under its control or influence in the form of
the judge and potentially the jury if the case were for some reason not settled prior to trial.
This brings into play the hard reality of legal disputes for clients. In
this situation I had already done a great deal of pro bono research and analysis on the case, including demonstrating that factually and legally a major
element of the probable defense that would be raised by the Diocese, the
ministerial exception to governmental oversight of its hiring and firing decisions, would not apply in this case. The law firm was also provided with a
factual analysis that indicated the official who terminated the claimant's
contract did so with full knowledge of his disability and accelerated the
termination shortly after he was reminded of the federally-protected disability.
Even with a major part of the factual and legal analysis already prepared, the claimant's law firm ran up a $40,000 bill. At $200 per hour this
represents 200 hours or five full weeks of billable time at eight hours per
day. There was no legitimate reason to spend that kind of time when much
of the factual and legal research work had already been done. Somehow,
reviewing research and conducting a half-day mediation session generated
extensive billings that appear to involve a surprising amount of work of
some kind that produced no positive results. Nor is it obvious why a substantial proportion of the time was necessary. But at the point where they
are operating on the "first blush" of a substantial client retainer, lawyers are
quite adept at filling up time sheets and running up bills through unnecessary duplication of work, use of more lawyers than necessary even in a case
where the limited ability to pay a fee was made obvious from the beginning,
and using billing "multipliers" in which fifteen or twenty minute billing
increments were applied even if only five or ten minutes were devoted to
the dispute. In that situation it is possible for an hour of "real time" to result
in billings for three or four hours of alleged case work. A client who has
been informed he is paying for an associate at $200 per hour is unaware the
effective hourly fee is actually $600 to $800 per hour depending on the billing sophistication of the lawyer and the law firm's billing increment practices.
A result in this case was that the claimant fired the law firm and is in
the process of seeking new counsel who will accept the case on a contin-
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gency basis. He was assisted by a new firm that, even though it was still
deciding whether to accept the case, drafted a pro se complaint for the
claimant and advised him about the procedures involved in filing in federal
court, which he was able to do one day before the statute of limitations ran.
He had asked the original firm to draft the pro se complaint for him two
weeks earlier and received a response only a few days before the deadline
that they would do so only if he paid a $10,000 retainer prior to receiving
the service.
This means that after more than a year of representation that produced
no positive results and drained the client's resources of more than $40,000,
the original firm was fully willing to let his claim be rendered moot by the
running of the statute. The lawyer who had been responsible in the case
also, for the first time, admitted that he had never actually taken a case like
this to litigation, even though we had engaged in discussions from the beginning about the probable need for a court filing, and he indicated that
there was no problem with that. The new firm, even though it had not yet
made a final decision concerning representation, contributed several days of
attorney time drafting the pro se complaint in order to protect the claimant,
demonstrating that there are still some admirable professionals out there.
G. Case # 7: "Churning" for the Lawyer's Profit
Wasting client resources under the guise of providing an aggressive
representation is called "churning." One critic states the "hourly fee system
is a devilish creature that rewards inefficiency and paralyzes productivity."28
Typical abuses include billing unworked hours, senior partners billing at
their high rate for the work of junior personnel, advising clients not to accept settlements that are reasonable so the firm can keep billing, taking unnecessary depositions, and failing to provide detailed bills so the clients
can't accurately monitor what has been done.29
As Lisa Lerman suggests, too many lawyers "chum" cases to maximize their own earnings rather than to advance their clients' interests.30 This
can occur even to the point of convincing clients to turn down reasonable
settlement offers through disparaging the proposed deal and overestimating
the probability of a positive outcome to persuade clients to take a chance on
a significantly greater outcome than may be realistic but represents the lawyer's "crap shoot" aimed at maximizing a return to himself. In examining
the behavior of the divorce bar in Washington, D.C., Kim Eisler concludes:
28.

Dianne K. Dailey et al., Alternative Billing Systems: Abandoning Time as a

Measurable of Value, 27 SPG BRIEF 44 (1998); see also NADER & SMITH, supra note 20.
29. NADER & SMITH, supra note 20.

30. Such issues are discussed at length in Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation ofBilling and Expense Fraudby Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 205 (1999).
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"The beauty of it, from the unscrupulous lawyer's point of view, is that although the client is being fleeced, he or she thinks the lawyer is a fierce
fighter for the cause."" It is unethical and substandard professional behavior
for a lawyer to chum a case for personal profit by engaging in unnecessary
activity that magnifies a client's bill for the lawyer's benefit. The same can
be said for negotiating a deal with an opposing lawyer that looks good to an
unsophisticated client forced to rely on the lawyer's "expertise" but which
the lawyer knows is considerably less than could have reasonably been obtained for the client or considerably more than the client should have had to
pay to settle a dispute. Not responding to client needs, not being professional in the preparation of a case, not keeping accurate track of work actually
done, and overbilling all represent unprofessional lawyering.
Divorce cases are among the worst examples of churning, although in
my experience bankruptcy is not far behind if there is a remaining asset in
the bankruptcy estate with value from which fees can be extracted. A few
months after first retaining a lawyer, clients can be overwhelmed when the
legal fees in their divorce proceeding have somehow escalated to twenty or
thirty thousand dollars, plus rapidly ballooning litigation expenses. Too
many divorce lawyers fight viciously until there are no assets left. Then it is
time to settle or to sue the clients for unpaid fees incurred "on their behalf."
Most lawyers are not like this, but too many are. One of the most frustrating
aspects of law practice that allows this to happen is that the "negotiation
dance" takes two to do it right. Even if you are trying to settle a case in
good faith, if you find yourself opposed by a lawyer who is churning the
case to run up fees, virtually nothing you can do will work because the lawyer is working in his or her own interest, not the client's.
H. Case # 8: Billing for Work Not Done
Churning a case is bad enough. Billing for work not done is reprehensible, fraudulent, and criminal. One of the most brazen examples I have
encountered involves a business bankruptcy case in which I was involved.
The lawyer who in theory was representing an opponent but who had actually been supplanted by that client with a different lawyer the client had
used in other cases, ended up filing a request for $450,000 in fees in the
final part of the case. This represented 1,500 hours (or the equivalent of
37.5 weeks of forty hours of work per week) spent on the case at $300 per
hour. This lawyer had rarely met with his supposed client, was not involved
in any of the negotiations, and played no role in agreements reached to settle the case. We opposed the request and the court reduced the fee claim to
$70,000, which is still pretty good pay for doing nothing. The point is that
31.

Eisler, supranote 22.
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the audacity of submitting such a preposterous fee claim should in itself
have been considered a shocking primafacie breach of professional ethics
sufficient to result in significant sanctions. Yet no sanctions were forthcoming even though the Bankruptcy judge was aware of what had occurred but
chose not to investigate further.
I. Case # 9: Totally Failing the Client
Assume a case in which several individuals insisted they were entitled
to what my client considered to be fraud-derived payments of approximately $50,000 each. It should be pointed out that as board members of the
company involved in the dispute, the two defendants as officers and directors had already paid themselves over $200,000 each prior to leaving the
company. We weren't even trying to have them return the clearly questionable and self-dealing funds they had diverted. I researched the situation,
wrote an extensive memorandum detailing why there was no obligation and
explaining that the opponents were in fact potentially liable for damages
flowing from a wide range of business torts, statutory violations, and fiduciary breaches.
This memorandum was shared with the opposing lawyer who had
been initially retained, and to his credit, promptly withdrew from the case.
But the potential defendant promptly obtained another lawyer who simply
ignored the facts and issues and demanded payment of the alleged obligation and announced a two-week deadline or they would file suit. Not wanting to be in a defensive position, we filed suit in arbitration a week later
based on the opponent's threat. The next year was spent running up fees and
expenses even though it was a situation that could and should have been
resolved by the opponents walking away from their initial demands.
During the ensuing year we could not persuade the opposing lawyers
to engage in any serious settlement discussions. A consequence was that I
was forced to spend significant time in further investigation and discovery.
This ironically resulted in the discovery of facts that not only further supported our claim of fraud, but identified other significant breaches by the
opposing clients involving the potential for substantial damages related not
only to the questioned payments they had given themselves, but stock manipulation. The information came from electronic records provided by the
opponents and even suggested the possibility of criminal violations. Given
the substantial amount of time I spent reviewing the electronic records and
e-mails they provided, I consider it unlikely that the opposing lawyers even
knew what they contained or what they indicated about their clients' behavior. We remain convinced to this day that the opponents' lawyers were unaware of how bad their clients' behavior had been and the extent of their
potential exposure even though we had provided them with a detailed legal
and factual brief and other clear signals.
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By the time of the scheduled arbitration, the opponents' position was
dire. On the day of the final arbitration hearing, a settlement was reached
that, valued today, is worth something in the vicinity of [at least] $7.5 million in favor of our client. The initial potential offer we offered the opponents for a walk away low-cost surrender of their bogus $95,000 claim, to
which it was clear they were not really entitled, ended up as a massive and
entirely unnecessary loss to those clients. It could have been avoided if their
lawyers had been operating in their clients' best interests. But it seemed
clear during the final settlement discussions that they did not understand
what the case was about even though we had supplied them with detailed
facts and analysis. They had, on the other hand, almost certainly collected
hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees from their clients while rendering entirely substandard representation. Their clients were of course entirely unaware of how badly they had been treated by their "trusted" representatives. It was our clear impression that the opposing lawyers had never
actually read the briefs and key materials we had provided and chose instead to rely on a strategy of bluster, threat, and stonewall. It served the
lawyers' financial interests but damaged their clients severely.
Nor was the law firm we engaged as local counsel in this dispute free
from fee abuse. It assigned a completely inexperienced new lawyer to the
case. This individual, a young associate with very limited practical experience but who possessed legal research skills she was pleased to apply far
beyond what was necessary because it was what she knew how to do, proceeded to replicate extensive research that we had already provided the firm
and produce lengthy duplicative memos on that material. The researching
lawyer's lack of litigation experience resulted in serious and expensive errors that quickly ate up a $15,000 retainer and ended up costing more than
$60,000 in fees before the case was settled. The more senior lawyer supposedly managing the out-of-state case was apparently "burned out" after several decades of practice and made questionable decisions and agreements
with opponents without discussing them with us. Ultimately both lawyers
were removed from the case and then from the law firm. The senior partner
of the firm acknowledged that mistakes had been made and the fee request
was discounted significantly.
J. Case # 10: The Irresistible $18,000,000 "Pot of Gold"
I experienced overbilling and churning conduct by a wide array of
lawyers when I was appointed a member of a client committee in a bankruptcy case in California. From the clients' perspective the problem was not
that there was $18,000,000 cash sitting in a bank account, but that all the
lawyers in Southern California knew about it, including those representing
the various parties in the case. None of the lawyers could resist the temptation to "churn" the dispute and process in ways that generated significantly
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higher fees and delayed the outcome. This was, for example, a case where
the investors' committee was told initially by its lawyers that everything
should be resolved in no more than a year to a year and a half. Unfortunately the four different law firms that were billing against the bankruptcy estate
dragged things out for more than three years and drained over $4 million
from the bankruptcy estate before the case was resolved. I went over the
billing records from the law firms and found them replete with senior lawyers who otherwise had no connection with the case holding regular "case
review" sessions, apparently to remind themselves every week or two what
the dispute was about. These chummy hour-long get-togethers were billed at
group rates of $2000 per hour and more.
As suggested in the final paragraph of the immediately preceding example, the dismal fact is that it is not only opposing lawyers who are the
"bad guys." The client committee's own lawyers kept telling us that the case
was "almost done" and that they had largely completed their work. We later
found out that the agreements they drafted were incomplete in numerous
ways. After exiting bankruptcy it was discovered they had neglected to deal
with several important matters that ended up costing the reconstituted company a minimum of several hundred thousand dollars. When the issue of
failing to structure the reorganization in a way that would have allowed the
new corporate entity to avoid SEC reporting requirements is taken into account, the cost of the lawyers' omissions after the new company exited
bankruptcy grew to over $2 million due to added business costs and staffing
requirements directly related to the public reporting, securities, and auditing
rules associated with SEC reporting companies.
The overall essence of the experience from the point of view of those
who served on the client committee was the exposure to lies, misrepresentations, false promises, incompetence and massive "churning," and bill padding. This was not conduct by a single unethical lawyer but conduct that
occurred across the board on the part of four different law firms whose
"business" practices conveniently maximized their own return at their clients' expense. The business model of bankruptcy practice encouraged the
behavior. In the final billing by the firms prior to finalizing the reorganization plan, the client committee independently raised an objection to
the gross over-billing. Rather than attempt to justify their behaviour, the law
firms involved quickly agreed to reduce their legal bills by ten percent
across the board. Given all the variables and risks involved in other approaches, this approach was accepted. What this reveals about lawyers'
ethical behavior when there is money to be made is, however, both dismal
and profound.
After exiting bankruptcy and discovering just how poor a job the lawyers had done, the restructured company considered pursuing a remedy
through malpractice, but such litigation would have been time consuming,
expensive, taken years, and been a diversion of energy and focus from the
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business at a critical point in its "new life." The decision was made to "play
the hand" that had been dealt and get on with the business.
K. Case # 11: A Classic "Day of Trial" Settlement
The system of litigation-based dispute resolution relies heavily on last
minute settlements. One of the primary reasons for this is that generally
both sides have engaged in less than ideal case evaluation and preparation
but have made it seem as if they are representing the client aggressively
while maximizing available fees. Clients don't actually know what their
lawyers have done to prepare a case, and it doesn't require a great deal of
last minute "flash" to make it seem that a lawyer has been diligent.
Even when there are authoritative dispute resolution procedures such
as are represented by binding arbitration and trial, the timing of any negotiated resolution still tends to occur at or near the moment of the formal event
in which the dispute is to be submitted to the authority of the independent
decision maker. In some instances this can be justified because in many
instances it is only when a party understands that the game of "chicken" has
reached its endpoint that reality comes into play and leverage is maximized.
It is also true that for many clients who are in the position of the defendant
party, the lengthy "stretch-out" strategy so often employed in reaching
agreement at the point of the trial or arbitration hearing is aimed at holding
onto assets and benefits for as long as possible.
Delay also involves trying to wear down plaintiffs in order to exhaust
their assets and to impose psychological and other costs that enhance the
likelihood of a settlement on the defendants' terms. In some instances assets
that were sufficient to satisfy all or part of a substantial judgment will have
been diminished significantly prior to final settlement, trial, or arbitration, at
best limiting settlement options or generating another costly round of litigation in an effort to pursue recovery. Those assets may also have gone to pay
the lawyers' increasing legal fees generated due to the delaying strategies.
Behavior involving delay or failure to prepare a case adequately or
evaluate the probable outcome of the dispute is not uncommon. One of the
most recent examples involved the far too typical "day of trial" settlement
by two opposing defendants we sued for breach of their duties on a corporate board involving the diversion of company funds for inappropriate purposes. A year earlier we had given the two individuals and their lawyers a
chance to walk away from their claim that they were owed a substantial
amount of money as their final share of the contested payments.
All we received in return was bluster and threats to sue, so we preempted the situation and filed first. Our strategy included a full and transparent sharing of information and claims against the defendants, which we
discovered later their lawyers had either not read or understood. After a year
of contentious interaction, on the day when the trial was to begin the de-
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fendants ended up agreeing to a settlement that cost their clients between
$8-10 million in surrendered stock and options when they could have
walked away a year earlier simply by abandoning the bogus claim.
It is difficult to understand what was going on in the minds of the defendants' lawyers other than the desire to obtain a steady flow of legal fees.
The fees generated for them almost surely added up to somewhere between
$150,000-$200,000, increasing their clients' out-of-pocket cash losses dramatically. They had been provided a full and detailed factual and legal explanation of their clients' exposure to a variety of serious claims that went
well beyond the immediate dispute and of our intention to pursue them aggressively if they failed to settle. This included evidence of wrongdoing that
was irrefutable and that came from files produced from their own clients.
The result was that rather than obtaining the demanded final payments, the
defendants lost total value in the vicinity of $10 million.
The line between legal and illegal conduct was obviously blurred for
one of the opposing lawyers because it was clear from his statements during
settlement negotiations that he had delayed settlement because he was convinced that our client was planning to engage in the same kind of fraudulent
stock-price manipulation scheme that his client had done, and that he hoped
to gain from stock appreciation. His expectation that we would engage in
fraud and illegal behavior of the kind that we had argued was done by his
client shaped his unethical settlement strategy. The fact that we had informed him that we were preparing to file a civil RICO action was somehow ignored.
But even that was not the end. While one defendant signed the agreement shortly after the "day-of-trial" settlement was reached, the other lawyer spent another four months dragging his feet after settlement while disagreeing and nitpicking until we resubmitted the case for an enforcement
order and costs. At that point he immediately folded and paid. But the lawyer made fees during that period. Our local in-state lawyers who were representing us in the jurisdiction refused to submit the part of our demand that
sought fees and sanctions from the opposing lawyer for his bad faith even
though they admitted the opposing lawyer had behaved unethically.
This raises another serious flaw in the current system of representation, one that undermines the ability to achieve effective service to clients.
Because our local law firm feared that a request for sanctions and fees
would offend other lawyers in the area of their practice, the lawyers did not
want to pursue a remedy to which our client was clearly entitled. This position was taken even though they admitted there was improper delay and bad
faith on the part of the opposing lawyer. They took this position even while
they attempted to charge my client for the additional legal fees caused by
the lawyer's unreasonable delays rather than seek penalties against him.
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We did not pay the extra fees. We did not pay, but many clients would have
done so without knowing their lawyers had disserved them.3
L. Case # 12: Delaying Execution of a Settlement in an Effort to Gain the
Corpus of a Client's Recovery
A particularly egregious situation was one in which an opposing lawyer dragged his feet on finalizing a settlement that had been agreed to in
court because he wanted us to have seventy percent of the 200,000 company
shares that represented the corpus of the agreement issued to his law firm
and only thirty percent to his client. He never responded to our request to
have his client provide written instructions signifying his agreement to such
a fee arrangement. After more than six months of protracted delay, his client
contacted the company's CEO and complained about the fact that he had
not received his shares. It turned out his lawyer had never communicated to
him about the request to have the bulk of the shares issued to his law firm or
said anything about our insistence that we receive clear written instructions
from the client authorizing the action.
When the opposing client reiterated this to his attorney, the lawyer apparently insisted that he receive the shares and threatened the client with a
lawsuit for fees if he did not do what the lawyer demanded. The opposing
client then fired his lawyer and retained another attorney, and the settlement
was finalized. Given that the shares were restricted securities that had to be
held a minimum of one year before they could be traded freely, the eventual
nine month delay inhibited the opposing client's ability to trade the shares at
his option during a period of rapidly rising value.
If this were a settlement for $200,000 and a lawyer said to the opposing side's lawyer, "I demand that you make out three separate checks, one
for $120,000 to my firm, anotherfor $20,000 to a firm I used, and the third
for $60,000 to the client on whose behalf I have been working," that opposing lawyer would say: "You have to be kidding!" We told the lawyer: "This
is something we will not do. If you do not have a valid written fee agreement with your client Mr. Smith to provide us authorizing the nearly seventy percent fee you are trying to have our client deliver directly to you then
that is your problem. In any event, as an ethical matter we will not be party
to such an excessive fee arrangement."
This was not enough to convince the lawyer to move ahead on what
had been agreed. The amazing thing was that it turned out he had not ever
discussed the actual settlement document with his client that we sent shortly
after the in-court settlement. Nor had he been authorized to instruct us to
split the shares in the way he demanded. It turned out he had not discussed
32.

There are many other examples. See Bamhizer, supra note 9, at 228-32.
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the facially unreasonable fee arrangement with his client. When his client
refused to do what was demanded, he threatened to sue his client for fees
even while continuing to "represent" the client and demand that he agree to
the seventy percent legal fee. Given that the value of the developing company's shares increased dramatically during this period of controversy and
delay, it seemed clear that the lawyer wanted to "ride the wave" and receive
a return approximately 800 percent greater than he would have received in
relation to the financial value of the shares on the day the initial agreement
was reached.
PART II
A. How Do Lawyers Get Away with Unprofessional Behavior?
The analysis offered here concludes that the system of lawyer regulation is-at least as applied to clients-broken and not capable of being
"fixed" through traditional means based on prevailing assumptions about
such things as self-regulation and the shaping effects on lawyers' behavior
of "good" inherent values and principles.33 The system is such an obvious
sham that it is best described as "unethical" in the sense that it has not ever
actually worked as a serious deterrent of corrupt professional behavior, and
it is getting worse rather than better. The recommendation is that the bur33. The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct sets out the claim to selfregulation in three paragraphs of its Preamble. If the facts demonstrate that lawyers and
judges are not doing what the rhetoric and assumptions claim they must do in order to be
legitimate regulators, then the clear conclusion is that they cannot be trusted with the responsibility and a different system should be created. The provisions on which the existing system rests are:
[10] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also
have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this
respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes
of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that
ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.
[11] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling,
the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps
maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under
law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose
members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.
[ 12] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance ofparochial or
self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PREAMBLE (2011) (emphasis added).

376

Michigan State Law Review

Vol. 2012:347

geoning "cottage industry" involving legal ethics as designed by the American Bar Association, adopted in various forms by state supreme courts and
taught as a mandated subject by law schools, should be rejected and abandoned. In its place should be a civil liability system in which wronged clients can hold their lawyers to account based on a clear set of rules, audits,
cost, and outcome estimates. It should also allow for statutory damages in
situations where clear wrongs have occurred, but damages are relatively
small or speculative.
Instead of continuing to tinker on the margins with the pretense of trying to improve a system that has consistently been demonstrated not to work
effectively, there should be a statutory system designed to regulate the delivery of legal services to consumers.34 This consumer-oriented system
would be aimed at setting effective standards for legal services, including
honest pricing, estimates, record keeping, audits, warranties, negligence,
license removal, and suspension for major violations and so forth. It should
contain clear damage provisions, including devices such as minimum penalties if breach of duty is established and treble damages for major violations.
The reasons for these recommendations are varied. One of the most
damning is that the existing system comprised of the ethics rules and judicial oversight of lawyers in disputed cases is not only ineffective, but if we
are honest, is of a character where it is designed to fail in any self-interested
and competitive context in which the actors are empowered as the arbiters
of the quality of their own conduct. Nor is the problem simply one of questionable enforcement of the formal rules of legal ethics through bar associations and grievance committees overseen by state courts. The doctrines of
the existing lawyer malpractice system make it an ineffective means for
holding lawyers to account other than in the most rare instances where wellfunded clients can afford to pursue their former lawyers for compensation.
The challenge for reform is that the systems by which lawyers are
purportedly regulated are not simply imperfect. They are unworkable. The
system is a sham and dishonest gimmick that offers the pretense of profes34. James C. Turner & Suzanne M. Mishkin, Attorney Discipline: System Must
Weed Out UnethicalLawyers Who Damage Profession'sReputation, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 16,
2002, at 6. It states: "In 1970, a blue ribbon panel led by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom
Clark conducted a groundbreaking review of the attorney discipline system, and found a
'scandalous situation' that required 'the immediate attention of the profession."' Id. Given
the great expansion in the number of lawyers competing for their slice of the "pie," heavy
debt loads, and loss of core values that might have at least mitigated the decline in professionalism, the situation has actually worsened since Justice Clark's committee issued this
warning. The remedy does not lie in any of the traditional approaches in which lawyers and
courts are in charge of the disciplinary system. A new approach is required and no variation
of "business as usual" will work. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY

ENFORCEMENT,

PROBLEMS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

IN

DISCIPLINARY

ENFORCEMENT (1970), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfn?com=
SC I33000&new ("The Clark Report").
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sional regulation with only the slightest substance. It aims to project the
image of self-regulation by lawyers and judges when in fact it may well
have the opposite effect given the widespread awareness by lawyers that it
has little to do with what they do in their practices. Not only is the system of
ethics largely tangential to what lawyers do, it is controlled and ruled over
by the very people it purports to regulate-a "fox-in-the-henhouse" formula
that guarantees a lowest common denominator orientation since the judicial
and lawyer authorities are in essence regulating themselves.
Legal ethicist Thomas Shaffer offers a useful perspective, quoting
G.K. Chesterton: "The horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best,
[including] . . . all judges, . . . is not that they are wicked (some of them are
good), not that they are stupid (some of them are quite intelligent), it is
simply that they have got used to it."" If "familiarity breeds contempt,"
lawyers who are responsible for holding themselves and other lawyers to a
high standard have contempt for the system according to which they are
supposed to operate in providing services to their clients. A result is that
they continually overlook and rationalize unprofessional behavior both by
others and themselves.
Another cause of the ineffective system that allows lawyers to be
largely unaccountable for the quality of representation rendered to clients is
that the clients who feel they have been betrayed by their lawyers have to
obtain other legal counsel, and that is itself a problem. Legal malpractice
cases are often complicated and other lawyers generally do not want to handle a case against another member of the lawyer "guild." It is seldom that
lawyers to whom wronged clients go to pursue redress against a former
lawyer are willing to take cases on a contingency fee basis. This is due to
the amount of damages in controversy, the problems with proof in some
disputes, and the fact that it is obvious that the opponent is a lawyer and will
be able to assume some of the costs by their own work in contrast to ordinary opponents who need to pay lawyer fees.
When it comes to legal malpractice actions, the existing legal and equitable remedies that are available in theory apply almost exclusively to
very well-financed clients and large corporations who can pay for the cost
of the remedy to which they are entitled. For ordinary clients, even reasonably well-off upper middle class clients, the costs of pursuing remedies are
35. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND
10 (1977). Shaffer continues:
People in institutions have a way of acting, an official tendency to turn other peopie into commodities, and to excuse themselves with grand, official phrases such as
health, justice, equality, due process, privacy, democracy, and the rule of law. But
behind the phrases are hidden patterns of behavior that show, when brought into
the light, that people in institutions usually do not have values strong enough for
community life.
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 109 (1987).
PEOPLE
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prohibitive. It is often the case that the wronged clients have exhausted their
resources with the first lawyer and can't afford to pay another lawyer either
at all or without exacerbating an already difficult situation by sinking deeper
into debt.
It is useful to gain an understanding that a legal malpractice case is
more complex, and therefore expensive, than many other forms of litigation.
Legal malpractice involves what is referred to as a "suit within a suit" in
that the merit of the underlying case (the one the first lawyer is alleged to
have messed up) is a critical element of the malpractice claim. This obviously raises the bar and the costs of the litigation and, along with the fact
that it clearly will involve another lawyer as an opponent capable of fighting
aggressively with delaying tactics and motions, adds another layer of expense and complexity. 6
The result is that there are remedies on paper that are unworkable for
virtually all clients failed by their lawyers. Consequently, incompetent, neglectful, and venal lawyers get a free ride for unprofessional behavior. This
unfairly costs their unfortunate clients either unnecessary legal fees and
expenses or inappropriate settlements or other recoveries or payments, and
it is a form of corruption."
36. For a description of the legal basics of a malpractice claim against a lawyer see
John P. Blumberg, Pitfalls of the Legal Malpractice Lawsuit, BLUMBERG LAW OFFICES,
http://www.blumberglaw.com/article-pitfalls.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2012). Blumberg
writes:
A legal malpractice case is viable only if there is underlying causation. That is
to say, "no harm-no foul." The inquiry begins with the former case, also known
as the "underlying" case. For example, in Harris v. Smith (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d
100, the previous attorney had not filed the complaint before the expiration of the
one-year statute of limitations. However, the subsequent legal malpractice case resulted in a non-suit because the plaintiff was unable to prove that the underlying
action was meritorious. Similarly, in Sukoff v. Lemkin (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d
740, the previous attorney did not investigate the assets of his client's husband in a
dissolution of marriage case, but the plaintiff lost her legal malpractice case because she did not prove that the attorney's failure to investigate the assets would
have actually led to a higher award.
These legal malpractice cases were unsuccessful because the plaintiffs could
not prove that their underlying cases had merit or that the result would have been
different. It is not enough that the prior lawyer was negligent; his or her error must
have caused damage. There are, in reality, two cases which must be proven in legal
malpractice litigation. After it is proven that the prior lawyer was negligent, the
plaintiff must essentially try (or re-try) the underlying case. This is called "the
case-within-the-case." The evaluation of the underlying case must be the starting
point of the lawyer considering whether to accept a legal malpractice case.
Id.
37. Robert Klitgaard writes:
[C]orruption may be represented as ..

. a formula: C = M + D - A. Corruption

equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. Whether the activity is public, private, or nonprofit, . . . one will tend to find corruption when an organization
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One area that should be mentioned, however, relates to the conduct of
lawyers involved in litigation and the already existing inherent powers of
judges to regulate the attorneys' behavior. Judges, for example, already
have extensive inherent power to sanction lawyers for their misconduct,
negligence, or sloth. Although judges have the authority to shape and sanction lawyers, it is rare that they exercise that power." The fact that few
sanctions are imposed by judges in the face of frequent abuses or delays
demonstrates the failure of the judge-controlled system in which the participants are in essence judging themselves as members of the professional
guild as much as anything. Even here there are alternative regulatory strategies that are more capable of shaping the behavior of lawyers.
Certainly this reluctance is understandable. Part of the problem goes to
the complexity, intrusiveness, and resource intensivity of what judges would
have to do in order to provide effective oversight. It would also require intrusion into what is supposed to be a secret process and create an expensive
bureaucracy that would take on a life of its own. While convinced the existing system too often fails clients, we need to think carefully about how best
to design and implement a better way of regulating lawyers. Part of the difficulty is caused by the allocation of who bears the burden of going forward
with investigations and sanctions.
In theory, lawyers are required to report unprofessional and unethical
behavior by other lawyers. This is a central element of a self-regulating profession. But lawyers rarely report delinquent behavior, and if they do it is
generally to gain a tactical advantage rather than concern for improving the
legal profession. There is very little chance that this culture of law practice
will change unless legal actions on behalf of allegedly wronged clients are
made more profitable for a specialized niche of lawyers who gain financially by suing or seeking pre-litigation settlements from other lawyers who
allegedly rendered substandard service. The disciplinary process will not do
this because it reacts to complaints rather than seeks them out. If clients
don't file grievances the disciplinary system will not take action.
The failure of judges to use their power to improve the quality of the
lawyers who appear before them has several less admirable causes. These
or person has monopoly power over a good or service, has the discretion to decide
who will receive it and how much that person will get, and is not accountable.
Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption, 35 FIN. & DEV., at 3, 4
(1998); see also ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988). It is hard to deny

that the "fit" between the legal profession's terms of operation and Klitgaard's categories is
uncomfortably tight. Lawyers and judges possess a monopoly over legal services and the
institutions of law. They possess the discretion to assess the quality of services and to determine when lawyers and judges are held accountable for their behavior.
38. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1389, 1461-78 (1992), for the proposition that courts are hesitant to deal with lawyers' conduct outside litigation.
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include not wanting to offend the people who contribute to their campaign
funds. They involve desiring to not anger lawyers who will be providing
responses for public indicators of support for the judicial candidate." The
probability that the judge behaved the same way prior to elevation to the
bench must be considered along with the "understanding" that "lawyers will
be lawyers."
It is also the fact that confrontation with lawyers is unpleasant, and
fact-finding is time-consuming and complex. Few people eagerly seek out
conflict they can avoid. There is an expectation that the lawyers are supposed to work out their disagreements, although this is increasingly unlikely
without strong judicial intervention. But some of the problem with judges
can be attributed to the fact that a percentage of the bench is just plain lazy
and doesn't want to be bothered.40 The bottom line is that in cases before
them, while judges actually possess extensive power of the kind required to
regulate lawyers they just don't do it. How you convince judges to use their
inherent powers is beyond me, but it begins with the nature of the particular
judge. Unfortunately we seem to be putting a fair number of less-thanqualified people on the bench.
B. The "Invisibility" of What Lawyers Do
In addition to lawyers' self-interest in not having a system of real accountability, one of the reasons there is an almost total lack of effective
regulation is that most of what lawyers do is invisible-to their clients, to
opposing lawyers, and to judges. When the lawyer's behavior is concealed
and there are no external monitors, the likelihood of initial detection of unprofessional behavior or of being held accountable and suffering sanctions
in any but the most dramatic situations is virtually nil.4 ' In such a context, if
a system is one in which there are no sufficient external mechanisms to inhibit unprincipled behavior and create incentives for principled conduct,
there must be a powerful and relevant internal code operating within the
individual. Those moral codes have mostly disappeared both because our
culture has become increasingly unprincipled and corrupt and because lawyers employed by law firms are controlled by the profit-seeking and survival strategies of those entities.42
39. On these issues see David Barnhizer, "On The Make ": Campaign Funding and
the Corruptingof the American Judiciary,50 CATH. U. L. REv. 361 (2001).
40. Id.
41.

Klitgaard, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION, supra note 37, at 52-55.

42. Walter Lippmann remarks that men have become dissolved into "'an anonymous
mass' because they are 'without an authentic world, without provenance or roots,"' without a
belief system and faith by which to live. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 87
(1956) (quoting KARL JASPERS, THE ORIGIN AND GOAL OF HISTORY 127-28 (Michael Bullock

trans., London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1953) (1949)).
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The task invisibility of much of law practice means that clients are at
the mercy of their lawyers concerning claims to activities made by the same
lawyers who keep the records. Nor are there means available to judge the
quality of what has occurred in critical areas of representation such as counseling, research, investigation, case analysis and evaluation, strategy, and
negotiation. Virtually all of what lawyers do takes place behind the closed
doors of their offices and through legal processes where the lawyers are the
only ones who know what has actually been done versus what is claimed.
This is made even easier by the fact that lawyers' opponents are behaving
according to the same self-interested norms. The "foxes" prance around
their own client territory and may "snarl" at each other to keep up the show
but always operate according to the sacred commandment, "There but for
the grace of God go I," and are cowed by the knowledge that accusations of
a lack of professionalism and loyalty to clients is a two-edged sword.
C. "Survival" Economics and an "Infestation" of Lawyers
The increased numbers of lawyers admitted to the legal profession
over the past few decades who are pursuing a finite pot of client fees caused
one Ohio judge to describe lawyers as "fleas." In sentencing an attorney for
dipping into client funds, the judge described the problem as one where
there was not enough legal work to go around but that law schools kept
churning out lawyers regardless of the legal profession's or society's need
or demand.43 In equating lawyers with "fleas" the judge said the lawyer he
was sentencing was obviously desperate for money and that: "'It's difficult
to earn a living."" He concluded: .'I'm not excusing you. I'm blaming the
entire legal profession.'""
43. The intense competition for clients can lead to a state of professional "burnout."
Susan Davis tells us of the consequences of burnout of the kind many lawyers are experiencing. A state of anxiety, fatigue, and depression makes the individual lawyer subject to negative values and behaviors. Susan Davis, Burnout, AM. HEALTH, Dec. 1994, at 48; see also
MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 4
(1994) (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, THE REPORT OF AT THE BREAKING POINT: THE EMERGING
CRISIS IN THE QUALITY OF LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LIVES-ITS IMPACT ON LAW FIRMS AND

CLIENT SERVICES (199 1)); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Lawyer Impairment: More Common Than
You Might Think, Denver Survey Suggests, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 32. A 1989 survey of
thirty-four managing partners of Denver-based law firms suggests that the problem of lawyer
impairment-one that firms of all sizes are slow to acknowledge and even slower at doing
something about-is far from unusual. "The causes of impairment were most often alcoholism and marital problems, and the areas of performance most often affected were billable
hours (seventy-nine percent), the ability to withstand pressure (seventy-nine percent) and the
quality of work (seventy-five percent)." Goldberg, supra,at 32.
44.
Dan Horn, Judge Decries Lawyers as "Fleas," CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 13,
2000, at 3B.

45. Id; see generally Most Law Graduates Dissappointed [sic]: Few Jobs, Low
Salaries, High Stress, L. STUDENT (Nov. 23, 2007), http://www.lawstudent.tv/2007/11/23/
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The problem with the "business" of private law practice is that few
lawyers find a queue of eager clients lining up outside the office door begging for the lawyer's services. The private practice of law on all levels, but
particularly on the tier of solo and small firm practice, involves a constant
hustle to identify and recruit clients willing and able to pay your fees. In the
United States there are many lawyers and fewer potential clients willing to
pay the costs of legal representation. Nor do many potential clients know
anything about the lawyers they retain regarding quality because there is no
way other than by talking to people who may have used that person's services and are satisfied with the results to even begin to obtain a sense of
ability and competence.
The explosive growth in the competing population of lawyers in private practice has produced a "survival of the fittest" reality in which clients
receive short shrift. From the standpoint of failure to protect client interests
through efficient and dedicated service, the lawyer's survival often means
having to milk maximum fees out of a case and spreading oneself too thin.
A result is that cases are poorly understood, badly investigated and researched, and inappropriately evaluated as to realistic outcome potential. A
consequence is that disputes are handled mainly with threats and bluster
rather than real professionalism.
The increasingly harsh competitive context faced by lawyers in private
practice is best understood by looking at the gross population of lawyers
that have flooded into the profession over the past twenty years or so. There
are more than 1.1 million lawyers licensed to practice in the US.46 This includes 400,000 who have entered the profession just in the past ten years,
representing nearly forty percent of the total number of lawyers engaged in
private practice. 47 Fifty percent of the lawyers in private practice are in solo
most-law-graduates-dissappointed-few-jobs-low-salaries-high-stress/ ("There seems to be a
growing problem among law school graduates and new attorneys. They can't find law jobs,
the jobs they find don't pay enough to repay law school loans, and the jobs require unhealthy
amounts of hours doing the type of work that many lawyers find unsatisfying, or worse. The
number of law school graduates continues to increase must [sic] faster than the number of
law jobs available. The supply of law graduates is high, but the demand has not kept pace. As
a result, law school graduates who did not graduate in the top 10% of a Tier I law school are
having great difficulty getting a job in law that pays enough to pay off their law school loans.
Further, even those law graduates who find jobs are often unhappy with the practice of law
and the high number of hours they must spend at the firm.").
46. AM. BAR Ass'N MARKET RESEARCH DEP'T, ABA LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS,
(2009), available at http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/Lawyer Demo
graphics.pdf [hereinafter LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS]; see United States Population Growth,
CENSUSSCOPE, http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart popl.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
The data place the 1980 population at 226,545,805, the 1990 population at 248,709,873, and
the 2000 population at 281,421,906. The 1970 population was 203,302,031. Id.
47. LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 47 (stating that 48% of U.S. lawyers were
in solo practice in 2000 and another 15% in 2-5 lawyer firms, resulting in 63% in those forms
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situations with another fifteen percent in very small law firms with 2-5 lawyers.48 The Chicago II study of solo practitioners concluded that in constant
dollars the annual earnings had declined in real value over a twenty-year
period from $99,000 to $55,000.49
In the twenty-year period between 1980 and 2000, there was an almost
100 percent increase in the number of solo practitioners (an additional
246,257 added to 1980's 265,580) and another 40,000 lawyers in the 2-5
lawyer firms." Given the fact that 400,000 new graduates have entered the
legal profession since 2000 and that the number of stable well-paying law
jobs with law firms has been under great pressure, it is reasonable to conclude that the majority of the more recent graduates have gone into solo
practices." Unfortunately, given the nature of American legal education that
pays no attention to the dynamics and needs of the tiers of law practice represented by solo practitioners and small firms, those graduates are quite illof law practice); see also CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL

REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000 (2004) [hereinafter LEGAL PROFESSION IN
2000]; CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S.
LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1995 (1999); BARBRA A. CURRAN, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER
STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION INthe 1980's
(1985); G.M. Filisko, Turn-around: Solos Seek Advice to Survive a StrugglingEconomy, 96
A.B.A. J., Mar. 2010, at 51, 51-55; LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 47. These numbers
are based on the total number of lawyers in 1980 versus 2000 multiplied by the percentage of
lawyers in solo practice 49% in 1980 and 48% in 2000, and by 22% in 2-5 person firms in
1980 and 15% in those "micro-firms" in 2000. Id. The differences do not stem from the
percentages themselves but from the growth in the absolute number of lawyers. For example,
see Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in Transition,20 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 19-54 (1986), who places the U.S. lawyer population at 542,000 at the beginning of 1980. See also LEGAL PROFESSION IN2000, supra, which reports 1,066,328 lawyers in
2000. Applying the percentages in each practice format (2-5 lawyer firms and solo practice)
results in 119,240 lawyers in the 2-5 person firms in 1980 versus 159,949 in 2000, and
265,580 solo practitioners in 1980 versus 511,837 in 2000.
48. LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 47.
49.

JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE

BAR 163, tbl. 7.1 (2005) (comparing mean and median lawyer incomes over the stated period).
50. LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 47.
51.
See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, PERSPECTIVES ON FALL 2009 LAW
STUDENT RECRUITING 1 (2010), available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Perspectiveson

FallRecG9.pdf ("As the U.S. and global economies were battered by 'the Great Recession' in
the third quarter of 2009, recruiting volumes by U.S. legal employers on the campuses of
U.S. law schools nose-dived. In fact, the data provided by NALP members about fall 2009
recruiting reveal that most of the trends and patterns that the industry had come to rely upon
were upended, dramatically so in some cases. All of the markers that measure the strength of
the legal employment market for new lawyers, such as law firm recruiting levels for summer
programs and summer program outcomes, fell in 2009, continuing and accelerating the general downward trend in recruiting volumes that was measured in 2008."); Karen Sloan,
Summer Associate Offers Hit 17-Year Low, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.law.com
/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJjsp?id=1202 445314748.
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prepared for what they face.5 2 Some form relationships with others unfortunate enough to be similarly situated to spread operating costs, or become
vulnerable junior associates in small firms that are themselves operating on
the margin.
The competitive pressures result in several kinds of malfeasance, including overbilling and billing for work not done by the lawyer. Lisa Lerman analyzed law firm practices involving hourly fees and found that:
Survey data . .. suggests that a majority of lawyers who bill by the hour at least
occasionally inflate their hours, and that a smaller percentage of them anonymously admit to larger-scale inflation of hours or fabrication of time records. Most lawyers report that other lawyers engage in billing fraud more often than they themselves do. 5 3

In this same vein, Ralph Nader and Wesley Smith relate the use of the
"BUTS Principle" for large law firms. The BUTS acronym stands for "Bill
Until They Squawk."54 Such action is obviously unprincipled and unethical.
It also is civil fraud and even criminal theft that is considerably more widespread in the legal profession.
The system has become one where many lawyers struggle to exist on
the fringes of the legal profession and have no realistic expectation of being
able to practice law as they had been led to believe was possible. The high
degree of professional skill and job satisfaction they anticipate, as well as a
reasonable income of the kind associated with professional status and the
expenditure of $100,000 or more they invested for law school are simply
out of reach." This produces a situation in which lawyers face almost insurmountable obstacles to professionalism both in terms of ethics and the
quality of professional performance. Their law practices are undercapitalized, they lack the skills and knowledge required for real professionalism,
have little or no access to mentoring relationships with more senior practi52. The Layoff List: Employment Shifis at The Am Law 200, Global 100, and other
Firms of Note, AM. L., May 19, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.
jsp?id=1202425647706; see Nate Raymond, Job Losses in Legal Sector Continue, AMLAW
DAILY, Apr. 3, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/job-losses-inlegal-sector-continue.html.
53.

54.
55.

Lerman, supra note 30, at 228.
NADER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 233.

See Law School EducationalDebt Has a Manageable Solution, ABA DIV. FOR
& COMM'N SERV., http://www.abanow.org/2009/1 I/law-schooleducational-debt-has-a-manageable-solution/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) ("Every year, law
students embark on a three-year course of study that will prepare them for a rewarding profession, but will also likely leave many of them with more than $80,000 of debt. It is increasingly common for law graduates to owe $100,000 or $150,000 and even more.") A recent
report concluded that a significant number of law students were graduating with at least
$120,000 in educational debt. See Paul L. Caron, 46%-60% of Law School Class of 2013
Will Graduate with $120k Debt, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 15, 2009), http://taxprof.typepad.
com/taxprof blog/2010/01/4660-of-law-.html.
MEDIA
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tioners, scrabble for clients in a cut-throat world of practice, and are constantly at risk from an ethical perspective due to inadequate fees and clients.
As indicated in the comments concerning the "task invisibility" of law
practice, lawyers can get away with such abuses because they operate in
what can be described as a non-transparent system in which the bulk of
what they do is obscured. In a non-transparent system where clients have
little knowledge of what their lawyers are actually doing and almost no ability to evaluate the quality of representation, typical abuses of clients include
not only billing unworked hours, but multiplying the billable hour through
the use of minimum time segments. This is achieved by billing twenty percent of an hour (using twelve minute billing increments as a minimum) even
if it is represented only by attempting a phone call and leaving a message on
voicemail. The lawyer may spend three or four minutes talking with a client
or another lawyer on a case but bill .20 hours for the interaction.
Done strategically, ten such contacts in a single "real" hour covering
sixty minutes could be transformed into 2.0 billable hours (10 x .20 minimum billing increments). Methods also include senior partners billing at
their higher rates for the work of junior personnel, firms billing lawyer rates
for paralegals and secretaries, advising clients not to accept settlements that
are reasonable so the firm can keep billing, taking unnecessary depositions,
and failing to provide detailed bills so the clients can't accurately monitor
what has been done.56 All represent techniques through which bad lawyers
cheat clients."
An added problem is that even though law firms tell clients they are
saving them money by assigning associates who bill fees at lesser rates to
do the work, in many instances the associates lack sufficient knowledge and
experience about the specific type of situation. The result is that the client
ends up paying for the associate's development of "intellectual capital" in
the area involved in the dispute. This can mean that clients are effectively
paying $400 or $500 per hour in terms of the associate's actual efficiency
because of the "getting up to speed" aspect of the situation and the need for
a senior attorney to review the associate's work.
The clients are in effect also paying for the lawyer's opportunity to
develop intellectual capital and experience in an area of which they were
unfamiliar, a situation where it would seem fair that the lawyer or firm "eat"
some of the developmental expenses involved in bringing the associate or
56. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 20.
57. See Lerman, supra note 30; Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition
to Greed to Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and ProfessionalIntegrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv.
879 (2002). Hourly billing has been described as "a devilish creature that rewards inefficiency and penalizes productivity." Kenneth Roberts, The Hourly Fee System is a "Devilish
Creature," in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING
METHODS 35 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989).
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otherwise inexperienced lawyer up to a reasonable level of knowledge to be
of actual use to the client. Clients should not have to pay for lawyers' onthe-job training time. Even here the reality can be worse because associates
are under pressure to maximize billable hours and can be doing needless or
redundant work under the rubric of paying the greatest attention to the client's needs. Nor is there any guarantee that the associate understands the
procedures and strategic context of the case sufficiently to make intelligent
decisions about priorities and focus.
Another typical condition is that if the client can pay a relatively limited fee, a lawyer often takes actions that consume that fee quickly to the
surprise of the client. Then the case is resolved at a relatively low level of
possible outcomes because the client is unable to pay the costs of continuing
the case. The case may lie dormant with no effort going into it because the
lawyer is insisting on payment of additional accrued fees. Rather than carefully understanding the resource limits and conserving them strategically,
the situation is approached at the beginning as if there were no such limits.
This results in a kind of "grinding" of a client's limited assets. All available
funds are extracted from accounts intended for other needs, credit cards are
"maxed," second mortgages are taken out, or lines of credit drawn down to
pay legal costs and fees that have ballooned far beyond original expectations that were either never discussed with the client, soft-pedaled, or given
"low-ball" estimates.
As discussed in several of the Examples in Part I, some lawyers
"chum" cases to maximize fees by doing unnecessary work or overbilling in
ways that exhaust the client's ability to pay relatively early in the process of
representation. This may be deliberate, in which case it borders on fraud, or
it may be that the lawyer feels that he or she is providing the highest possible quality of service by "covering all bases." It also has the effect of hooking the client into the process due to the large expenditures that have been
made so that they feel compelled to max out credit cards or deplete savings
or take out second mortgages because they become convinced it is the only
way to protect the significant investment that has already been made.
In that sense the behavior of many lawyers is a sort of low-level Ponzi
scheme in which the clients whose assets are being drained are the hopeless
and unwitting victims who keep investing because, like the bankrupted
Jarndyce heirs-apparent, they hope that there is a potential return that will
be to their benefit or at least make them whole. Once a client has been
drawn into the "fee web" far enough, the "sunk capital" produces a psychology of hope and resignation such that the client is caught in the web of
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poor legal service but continues to hope for a positive outcome." Seldom
does this work out.
If another fee arrangement such as a contingency fee is involved, the
ultimate outcome and degree of work done by the lawyer relates to how
many other cases the lawyer is involved in, the potential for a substantial
outcome relative to other cases and the amount of work involved, and other
demands on the lawyer's time." Even in the contingency situation where
fees do not seem to be the main issue in terms of initial fee charge to the
client, the need to expend scarce client funds on filing costs, expensive depositions, and expert witnesses also strains the ability of clients to sustain the
momentum in a dispute in which the client is required to cover litigation
expenses. In other contingency fee situations where the lawyer is advancing
the costs and deferring the receipt of fees anticipated from completion of the
dispute, the increasing out-of-pocket expenditures by the lawyer can also
work against the contingent fee client due to financial outlays the lawyer
desires or needs to recoup from a possible settlement. Lawyers, like other
businesses, have cash flow requirements for employee expenses, rent, utilities, taxes, and numerous other necessities that must be dealt with. A result
can be that the lawyer in need of money pushes for a settlement that is in his
interests rather than the client's.60
58. On this quite important issue, see BMA Editorial Team A, Making the Psychology of Sunk Costs Work for You, http://economics.bestmanagementarticles.com/a-36696making-the-psychology-of-sunk-costs-work-for-you.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
When making a decision, one of the worst errors is that of sunk costs; continually investing time, energy, and money into a project or course of action that is
not meeting its performance expectations or goals. Sunk cost errors are rooted in
the human psychological need to persevere and succeed regardless of insurmountable obstacles. This need is emotionally compounded as more and more resources
are invested into attaining an outcome that is logically implausible.
From a purely economic perspective, sunk costs refer to costs that have "already been committed and cannot be recovered." These costs should be ignored
when making future decisions because there is no course of action that would be
able to recover these resources, especially the time that has already been lost. Although this concept is easy to understand, people do not always make decisions rationally. Instead many allow feelings of regret to cloud their better judgment, and
continue on a failing path instead of admitting defeat, letting go, and avoiding future losses.
Id. (citations omitted). I argue from experience that this psychology has an enormous influence on clients who are dissatisfied with their lawyers but cannot let go because they hope
against hope that things will tum out well in the end. But in many instances they have already exhausted their resources and are caught in the mystery, ambiguity, and uncertainty of
the legal system which they simply do not understand.
59. On the problems with contingency fees, see, for example, Lester Brickman and
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to Critics of the Absolute
Ban, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 11 (1995), availableat SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract-1002943.
60. See generally the discussion of billing pressures in Lerman, supra note 30, at
225-27.
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These problems are exacerbated because in areas where disputes are
involved as opposed to transactional and counseling matters, the law business-driven behaviors of opposing lawyers play a significant part in determining the volume of costs and fees. Even if one lawyer is acting ethically
on behalf of his client, if the other lawyer has not properly prepared and
evaluated his client's case due to other business demands, laziness or has
given in to the desire to maximize fees, there is very little that can be done
to change the situation. Sorry about the clichd, but for principled outcomes
to occur it "takes two to tango," and if one lawyer isn't "dancing" because
that lawyer is self-dealing, there is not a great deal that can be done about it
under current rules.
PART III: FACTORS INVOLVED IN PERFORMING A CASE EVALUATION

Behaviors such as those discussed in Part I's Examples are clearly
ones that betray one's client and call for accountability through a system of
low-cost and accessible civil liability. Whether we are speaking of a corrupt
lawyer who is cheating his client, an incompetent or negligent lawyer, or a
lawyer overwhelmed by the competitive demands of law practice, most clients are unsophisticated consumers of legal services who lack the background or ability to understand what is or is not being done on their behalf.
As a general rule unsophisticated clients with little or no prior contact with
law and lawyers lack the ability to see what is or is not being done on their
behalf. They are at the mercy of their lawyers and are easily manipulated
and kept in the dark about what is being done. Nor do they have the ability
to judge the quality of the services they receive.
This state of ignorance is due to the "mystery" of the law and its processes and to the lack of task transparency in the relationship. Research,
telephone calls and investigation, strategic planning, and contacts with opponents and courts are activities that the clients generally do not see, assuming they are occurring at all. Clients consequently have to take the word of
their lawyers about the necessity, quality, and fact of the activities. This
includes not only taking the lawyer's word that tasks were actually done,
but that they needed to be done, that they were done at a substantial level of
quality, and that the time and effort claimed by the lawyer was not only
accurate but necessary. Clients are therefore at their lawyer's mercy, and too
many lawyers do not deserve their clients' trust.
For this part of the analysis the only principle is that of providing the
client with the best outcome that can be reasonably achieved through whatever mode of dispute resolution provides the most effective approach based
on the probabilities involved in the dispute or transaction. This might be
something as simple as not joining in or exacerbating a dispute because the
financial, time, energy, and emotional costs are such that even a "success-
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ful" outcome is a loss or "Pyrrhic Victory" that costs more than it is worth
when judged according to parameters critical to the client.
Lawyers owe clients pragmatic and detailed evaluations about what
approaches are possible and preferable. This includes the outcome probabilities for each path of action, the strengths and weaknesses of each side of
the dispute, the timing and conditions of how the interactions are likely to
play out, and the costs of the dispute depending on how the parties proceed.
This also requires that the lawyer assist the client in identifying clear, pragmatic, and realistic goals for the representation. The problem is that while
objective evaluative counseling is one of the most difficult aspects of a lawyer's provision of quality professional services to a client, for various reasons it is an area in which lawyers often fail their clients.
Learning how to perform early and effective strategic analyses is at
the heart of the responsibility lawyers owe clients even though such analyses sometimes works against the self-interest of lawyers if they mainly
want to "milk" a case in order to extract substantial monetary returns from
clients without having to spend a great deal of time on the matter. Although
the specific method and source of the evaluative analysis in which lawyers
should engage varies depending on the type and complexity of the caseincluding whether litigation or transactional issues are involved, the amount
in controversy, available resources, and client-type-the core assumption is
that too many clients are spending too much on cases and still not receiving
the kinds of resolutions to which they may be entitled.
As discussed in relation to the commodification of clients, at the heart
of the dilemma is that their lawyers have converted the dispute or transaction (the client) into a financial asset from which they are seeking to extract
maximum benefit for themselves or their firm rather than for the clients. In
such a situation lawyers are not champions or effective advocates concentrating on protecting their clients' interests, but business actors focused on
increasing their own return on the "asset" represented by the client's dispute
or transactional need.
In an effort to introduce the idea of early comprehensive case evaluation, I have set out below some of what I consider essential elements of efficient strategic analysis a lawyer might go through in handling a client's
matter and explaining key aspects. Some key principles of evaluation are
discussed here in an effort to show what factors come into play in transactions and disputes of the kind that lawyers should develop in order to ensure
that their clients better understand recommended courses of action and likely outcomes and costs. The idea is that lawyers are responsible for doing
certain things when handling a dispute or transaction for their clients as a
matter of contract, warranty, fiduciary duty, and agency law.
One reason lawyers get away with providing deficient representation,
as indicated previously, is that much of what lawyers do, should do, or purport to have done for their clients is invisible, taking place, if at all, behind
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closed doors. Another reason is that the costs of law practice and the earnings expectations and needs of lawyers have escalated to the point that
many lawyers in private practice are leading "helter-skelter" existences just
to make ends meet. Even for the best of lawyers operating on the solo and
micro-firm scale of private practice, the undertaking is tough unless they are
fortunate enough to have a substantial and dependable source of income
from clients such as local government or an insurance company that can
supply a steady and predictable flow of income.
Without that kind of sustainable and regular earnings base, many lawyers are engaged in a speculative business model whose core involves
scrounging for clients. The result of this speculative and uncertain model of
private law practice is that there is very little time to devote to the planning,
preparation, and implementation of a single client's dispute or transaction.
This means that the "ideal" approach to client representation involving what
should be done in the best-case scenario of representation is an impossibly
optimistic dream for many lawyers. It also means that it is absolutely vital
that a lawyer develop the skills of early case assessment so that intelligent
and effective strategies can be identified at a point where honest and accurate advice can be provided to the client.
The answer is not found in the current structure and content of law
school curricula. Law schools fail to deal with some of the most critical
aspects of client representation in which most lawyers in private practice
find themselves after graduation. One problem is that while clinical legal
education does offer one way to provide a limited number of students with a
controlled experience that introduces them to important aspects of law practice, the typical clinical experience has little to do with the demands and
strategies of private law practice in which many of the most serious problems of client betrayal exist. Clinical education programs have mainly been
designed as law reform and poverty law undertakings for admirable reasons.
It has also been the case that private lawyers did not want law school subsidized "house" law firms siphoning paying clients from the private bar.
Given the origins and nature of clinical programs, to the extent courses
in clinical education involve students in actual client representation, most of
the disputes and transactions involve clients without resources who are receiving the clinics' services free of charge. I am a strong supporter of clinical education, but the fact is that its focus on public interest concerns, social
justice, and impoverished clients does little to prepare law students for entry
into the competitive world of private practice. This is even more important
on the solo and micro-firm levels that so many new graduates are now entering.
Evaluation of the numerous variables involved in disputes and transactions is complex and inherently judgmental. It is also fact-driven and influenced by the personalities and capabilities of clients, opposing clients, and
attorneys. In other words, just as "beauty" is in the eye of the beholder, law-
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yers will have quite different opinions about their clients' cases depending
on the side they are representing. The gap between the competing evaluations may be completely reasonable. Or, unfortunately, it may be due to the
fact that one lawyer has figured out the probable outcome accurately but the
other is unprepared, inexperienced, unskilled, or unable to estimate probable
outcomes, risks, and values properly. In deciding whether to try or settle a
dispute, it is unfortunately too often the case that lawyers have not paid
enough attention to the dispute and the claims being made to make intelligent evaluations of its worth, risks, and outcome probabilities.
Reaching a settlement based on lawyers' mutually high quality assessments of the best ways to proceed is very difficult when one or both
sides have not done the hard work required. Ideally, the assessments should
be done at an early enough point to allow the lawyer to develop realistic
strategies that increase the probability of resolving the case when it should
be resolved rather than wasting resources and time. Similarly, relatively
early and realistic assessments of outcome probabilities can enable lawyers
to identify situations where it is unlikely that a reasonable resolution can be
achieved, whether due to legitimately different estimations of the likely
outcome or "churning" and other forms of unprofessional behavior by the
opposing lawyers.
But too many lawyers fail to do the diligent work required to assess
the risks, costs, and probabilities of achieving a particular desired outcome.
This is because too often they are evaluating the worth of the case in relation to the benefits that can be gained for their practice. This calculation is
done in relation to the scale of retainers and fees the lawyer can achieve or
by balancing the return on the individual case against the time required to
deal with other matters for which they are responsible. This is a fully rational business judgment and an equally unethical professional choice.
A. Evaluation Principle # 1: Identify Your Client's Reasonably Achievable
Goals and Available Resources
Winning is the ultimate purpose of legal representation. A lawyer's
representation of the client should be goal-driven, and the primary object is
to achieve a victory for the client, defined as the best and most pragmatic
possible outcome that can realistically be achieved. The lawyer should
begin the process of evaluation by asking what the outcome should be when
it is finished. Another way of saying this is what would be a victory or a
win in the specific interaction? In some instances winning is defined as
avoiding losing or at least mitigating negative consequences. Being goaldriven seems simple, but it is amazing how many people never focus clearly
on realistic goals aimed at achieving what I refer to as pragmaticdefinitions
of victory.
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Without a realistic and pragmatic definition of goals and the terms of
victory, other strategic considerations are largely irrelevant. The lawyer
must therefore ask at the beginning of the strategic process: "What is it that
we seek to achieve? What does our victory look like? Where do we want to
be when this is done? What price will the process exact, and how much of
that price are we willing to pay to achieve our ends?" This combines the
ideas of victories in specific tactical situations of a kind that advance a client's interests and victory in the totality of the dispute or transaction. This is
neither as easy nor as obvious as it sounds. Defining the specific terms of
victory not only for you, but your allies and adversaries is important. This is
because deception, false impressions, and hiding behind masks and illusions
are key elements of strategy. Both you and your opponents construct false
images of your positions and desires in an effort to achieve desired goals.
Understanding the terms of your victory and being aware of the most likely
terms of your opponent's victory helps you to hold to your perspective
against the illusions and the distorting pressures generated by the heat of
conflict. Being anchored in this way gives you a secure place from which to
perceive, evaluate, and choose paths of action. This helps you see through
the illusions.
Most "wins" are something less than a maximum possible or hypothetical "best case" outcome. The ability to define goals and objectives therefore includes knowing not only the conditions of a complete victory, but the
importance of the smaller and more intermediate wins that increase the
probability of your ultimate success or lay the groundwork for future successes. "Going for it all" when the risks are high, financial or psychological
costs significant, and the possibilities of achieving the desired outcome low
is something that can backfire and bankrupt. While your goals need to be
high, they must be reasonable and realistic. "Going for broke" is fine when
that is the client's stated goal after sound legal counseling, but is not acceptable unless the odds of success are in your favor.
The process of setting goals is difficult, opaque, shifting, and imperfect. Too often we get caught up in a conflict and forget that it is only a
means to an end. While winning is at the heart of strategy, the real nature of
victory in a specific interaction is a slippery phenomenon. Part of strategy is
being able to know when you have won or lost. We all have seen grand
masters in chess who are able to look at the board and tell whether they
have won or lost five or six moves ahead of the actual endgame. Knowing
whether you have won or lost requires, however, that you understand the
meaning of victory or at least know when it is necessary and possible to cut
your losses and save resources for another time, which is another form of
victory.
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B. Evaluation Principle # 2: Determine the Path of Dispute Resolution that
Offers the Best Chance to Achieve the Client's Goals
The first question we should ask when faced with the possibility of trial is whether it represents the wisest choice from among the available options that include negotiation, mediation, binding and non-binding arbitration, some other alternative strategies such as a private "rental" judge or
demonstrative "mini-trial" and trial. True victory is nearly always something less than optimal. This means that there is no single "best" outcome
that can be known in the earliest phases of a dispute. Being able to evaluate
a dispute as it unfolds depends on not only understanding your side of the
dispute but obtaining critical intelligence information through research, fact
investigation, records review and witness reports. Conducting this process
of intelligence gathering and being able to assess the import of the results
while weaving everything together as part of a strategic package are critical
skills for the lawyer. It also means the lawyer must help the client see that
what is desired may not be achievable or, if it is, that it can be won only at a
cost the client cannot afford. This is among the most important aspects of
trial strategy and other aspects of legal strategy.
Victory must be defined not in terms of what is wished for as a maximum outcome but in terms of what is realistically achievable within the
conditions and dynamics of the available processes. Pragmatic decisions
must be made that take into account the skills and resources available to you
compared with those within the control of the opponent. There will be situations in which the absolute maximum and the pragmatic determination of
the probable outcome are the same, but that occurs less than we might hope.
There are times when the "battle" must be fought and "war" is unavoidable. But given the potential "all or nothing" gambit that many trials
represent, the lawyer will generally determine that while the threat or possibility of trial is a very important component of the arsenal, the uncertainty
associated with trial continues to offer the impetus that ultimately results in
compromise and settlement in nearly all legal disputes. This means, however, that "victory" is rarely the absolute "best" that might be accomplished if
everything fell into place perfectly in the client's strategic path.
A result is that the lawyer can't afford to be deceived by the lure of
ideal or even highly desirable goals. The desires of a lawyer's client to
achieve a specific end must be taken into account in creating strategic goals,
but the lawyer fails if the desired goals are not realistic. The possibility of
trial is a substantial source of pressure because control over the outcome is
taken away from the disputing parties. But doing a trial is a high risk and
costly strategy. It should be used only when you have positioned your case
for victory or are given no realistic alternative in terms of your honest evaluation of the case.
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C. Evaluation Principle # 3: Educate Clients in the Fact that "Wars" Are
Costly and People Get Hurt
Trial is quite often the wrong course of action, one that imposes unnecessary costs on both parties. Lawyers should never forget that trial is
expensive, labor intensive, and emotionally draining for clients, families,
witnesses, and employees. Trial is often destructive for clients on both
sides, and ultimately uncertain in outcome. Trial outcomes are inherently
uncertain because trial outcomes depend on the capabilities, qualities, perception, and values of other people, and on the skills and knowledge of lawyers, clients, and witnesses. There are no outcome guarantees at trial, only
greater and lesser probabilities. Even this depends on accurate and honest
assessments by the lawyer.
This is one of the places where the ideal of professional service and
the economic reality of practice come into play. In terms of a fair case evaluation for a client in a disputed matter, few clients can afford to pay the full
costs of litigation or even a substantial portion of the costs involved in fees,
expenses, expert witnesses, costs, and the like. Along with this goes the fact
that a lawyer's overall caseload can be too heavy to allow full preparation of
the kind a case theoretically requires. In the finite universe of law practice,
one bounded by the limited time a lawyer has to spend on all the matters
represented in his or her caseload, few clients can afford to pay for the full
costs of litigation. Regardless of lawyers' frequent rhetoric about going to
trial, "something has to give" and that "something" almost inevitably represents trade-offs and short cuts on the various cases for which the lawyer is
responsible. The result is that the idea of full and complete trial preparation
is a myth except (perhaps) in the instances where the lawyers are funded by
wealthy corporate clients or well-heeled and staffed public institutions.
D. Evaluation Principle # 4: Assess Whether the Situation Involves Siege
Strategies by You or Your Opponent
The form of any possible settlement approach, as well as whether settlement is even possible, depends on a combination of factors. These include the stakes involved, the nature of the parties, and their relative resources and "staying power." Some of the most troubling issues occur in the
representation of large and powerful clients whose scale of operation and
ability to withstand attacks by those arguably wronged result in a severe
power imbalance to the extent that great harms can be imposed on helpless
people without resources adequate to the task of obtaining even a semblance
of justice. To the extent these powerful institutions rely on law and lawyers
to protect them, a real issue emerges about the role of lawyers in working
affirmatively both as counselors and guides that facilitate a client's ongoing
activity in ways that help their clients to do things that predictably harm
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large groups of people-and as advocates who serve their clients in dispute
resolution.
Fear of the verdicts reached by juries made up of regular people is also
why defensive strategies typically involve imposing significant costs and
delay on an opponent who generally has limited resources. The defense is
like a besieged fortified city protected by high stone walls. Degrading the
attacker's resources and will to keep on fighting in the face of high costs
and increasing casualties either results in a collapse of the siege or the willingness to agree to terms that are more favorable. A result is that many
powerful defendants seek to avoid populist juries. They do so because they
are often on the wrong side of the kinds of themes that trigger jury outrage.
A defendant's bad faith, abuse of a trust relationship, severity or type of
injuries caused by negligence or indifference, arrogance, greed, or callousness all represent themes that lead to substantial verdicts.
No lawyer can consistently predict the size of verdicts prior to trial.
What causes compromises through negotiated settlements is that the lawyers
cannot know for certain who will be on the jury. But they do know that jurors will tend to be regular people who will view what happened in terms of
the Golden Rule. The jurors will think about how they would want the defendants to behave if they (the jurors) were, for example, on the operating
table, helpless and forced to trust their well-being to doctors and hospitals.
Similarly, almost any juror will have dealt with insurance companies and
understand the tendency of many of the companies to try to get out from
under their contractual obligations. When members of a jury decide a plaintiff with whom they can easily identify because he or she is an ordinary
person like themselves has been harmed by greedy, malicious, or callous
behavior on the part of a powerful actor in the case, they have a tendency to
punish the large and powerful litigant who they decide has abused the "little
guy." But although that risk is always present, there is no certainty that the
jury will buy into the claimant's themes to the degree needed to achieve a
high verdict. Certainly, a lawyer's skill and track record provides some
sense of the probability, but each jury and trial is unique.
E. Evaluation Principle # 5: Evaluate the Risks, Costs, and Uncertainty of
Trial or Other Available or Mandated Forms of Dispute Resolution
Many goals can be achieved through cooperation. There are what have
been called "win-win" solutions to disputes. But even when there are not, it
is possible to craft proposed solutions that make it appear that each interest
in a dispute has obtained something of significant value. In order to resolve
disputes that would otherwise never end short of trial, lawyers need to determine how to present proposed outcomes in language that indicates their
clients are obtaining something they value highly, or that a client is saving a
great deal by settling because if the dispute went to an alternative forum for
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resolution, the client would lose a great deal more. As suggested above, in
many instances lawyers have not fully evaluated, analyzed, or prepared their
clients' cases.
This means that several dynamics are in play during settlement negotiations. One is that the lawyer really does not know what an optimal outcome should be-in essence is unaware of the worth of the case. Another
dynamic is that while the lawyer does not know the value of the case, he
does know that he has not done the necessary work to actually present the
case effectively at trial. This results in a great deal of bluffing and posturing
designed to generate the aura of substance and create a psychology of leverage, but in virtually all instances the fagade disappears on the eve of trial
when to go through with the litigation would reveal the inadequacies of
preparation and understanding.
A trial is frequently the consequence of failed negotiations that ought
to have resolved the dispute. But the problem is that it takes all sides to
agree on a settlement, and there are various reasons, both good and bad,
why agreement cannot be reached prior to trial. One quite common reason is
that one side is pursuing an agenda that precludes peaceful resolution for
reasons that may or may not be rational or well thought out. Another can be
that reasonable outcome assessments relating to the value of a jury verdict
relative to a settlement agreement are just too far apart.
The jury, judges, or arbitrators possess the power to interpret what is
offered by the lawyers and to choose the proper interpretation and outcome.
Even the best trial lawyers can only estimate the probabilities of what they
will do. But our ability to influence those choices depends on the degree to
which we can persuade the decision makers by projecting a reconstructed
"virtual reality" of what occurred along with offering a clear pathway to
what they should do based on our advocate's vision of the appropriate outcome. The virtual reality, however, is not the same as the "truth" of what
actually occurred but the advocate's reconstruction of the original context
into a frame of reference that projects the desired version of "reality." The
assertion that trials are a search for truth is inaccurate. Trials are the pursuit
of an outcome that is in your client's interest.
Resource expenditure or exhaustion of a client's finances is not the
only negative aspect of attempting to resolve legal disputes through trial.
Trials are battlefields comprised of probability, risks, and uncertainty. There
are no guarantees of being able to achieve the desired outcome or being able
to achieve it with efficiency in relation to costs and benefits. Uncertainty
permeates all phases of a trial. One critical fact of trial uncertainty is that
you cannot know in advance how your witnesses will actually come across
.on the stand, regardless of how well you have prepared them. Trial preparation is a form of strategic planning.
Of course you do everything possible prior to trial within the bounds
of resources and time. But even the most thorough case preparation and
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planning is only practice or simulation. As with any situation involving conflict, as soon as you move from the pre-trial planning phase to implementation before actual authoritative decision makers, there is the inevitability of
surprise, decision-maker bias, and impression that shapes your presentation,
evidentiary rulings, emotive nuances, positive or negative reactions to your
client or key witnesses, and much more to which you must adapt almost
instinctively-all while operating within the trial version of the "fog of war"
and extreme tension.
You may, for example, not have anticipated the use of a particularly
powerful theme by your opponent to which the jury is responding favorably.
Or the thematic approach you thought would work well may be falling flat
with the decision makers, requiring that you make judgments about an alternative path of action. Even though you may have used your powers of
visualization to anticipate positive and negative possibilities occurring, the
harder task is that even with such preparation you must possess the skills of
recognition and balance to understand what is occurring and react in a positive way to the opportunity or potential harm.
Trials are risky because they are about how humans perceive the
qualities, behaviors, and "likeability" of clients and witnesses far more than
about legalities. It is far more a humanistic process than a legalistic one.
Jurors, for example, are looking at you and your clients and assessing the
people based on impressions derived from stereotypes and prejudices. They
do not actually know the witnesses, clients, or lawyers or they would not be
sitting on the jury. It may be that a juror's judgment on a client is based not
on evidence, but on whether subconsciously the client strikes the juror as
someone in the juror's experience about whom he or she holds a strongly
positive or negative opinion. The idea that parties are entitled to have their
case determined by a jury of their "peers" has little or nothing to do with the
actual process. Or, alternatively, it may be that for some parties their peers
are the last group of people they would want judging them.
Nor can you know how the jury will evaluate the validity and economic worth of a disputed claim. Even if a jury opts for liability on behalf of a
suing litigant, that is only a "necessary" but "not sufficient" outcome for the
party seeking damages. This is particularly so when a damages claim involves "soft" non-economic damages or economic damages that require the
need to project future needs and consequences along with such things as
inflation and interest rates, life spans or work-related pay increases projected years into the future. As demonstrated in the earlier case examples, these
types of damages offer very risky scenarios in which juries' choices can
range from token damages even with a finding of liability to vastly multiplied financial levels that stun both lawyers and parties. Assessing, controlling, expanding, and contracting the risk and multiplier effects are key parts
of the trial lawyer's skill.
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A difficulty faced by all trial lawyers is that their party and other witnesses will often seem calm, effective, and capable of testifying well when
you are preparing them in your office but will be a surprisingly different
person when in front of the judge and jury. When it happens it is a "Jeckyll
and Hyde" experience in which your benign client becomes a monster. The
problem is that a trial is a live performance. Unlike movies or television
series, if mistakes are made at trial you do not get to stop the process, re-edit
the script, and do it over again until you get it right. A trial is not only a live
dramatic performance but one with amateur actors playing the key roles of
jurors and witnesses.
You cannot ever be quite certain what will happen. In the early phases
of my career, I had a client who tried to physically attack witnesses in the
courtroom whose testimony she did not like. While it was a judge-only trial,
I am certain the fact that he had her shackled after the second assault did not
work in her favor. I also had a client who had just flown in from out-of-state
the day of trial who told me during the preparation of testimony that her
mother-in-law had chased her out of the house with a .38 caliber revolver,
and that is why she left her husband. Several hours later at trial she responded to my question, "Did your mother-in-law do anything the day you left
that caused you to leave the house," with a flat, "No, there was no problem." This does not even touch the situations in which a client collapsed
during testimony due to a bleeding ulcer and was whisked away in an ambulance, or where an opposing husband in a divorce proceeding was grabbed
by deputies as he tried to bring a sawed off shotgun from his briefcase.
Nor does it present the situation where a client admitted after I handed
over the settlement check that the version of what had happened in a consumer dispute was not "quite" [not even close] what they had told me and
that they just wanted to get out of the deal they had made. It also does not
cover the case in which a client told me police had robbed him during a
traffic stop. I met with the prosecutor, and he agreed to pay for a lie detector
test and promised to file criminal charges against the police if the client
passed. We observed the test from behind a one-way mirror, and the client
was told at the end that there were questions about whether he was telling
the truth. He then admitted that he was lying and had been angry with the
police for stopping him and wanted to "get even." I thank the God of lawyers that when asked whether I knew anything about the lie that he told the
truth and said "no."
It never ends. In a drug case my defendant client told me an idiotic
story about what had occurred, and I responded by telling him it was stupid
and unbelievable. He responded, "I thought I would try it out on you, and if
you bought it I would run with that version." Or consider a case where during an initial jail interview with a prospective client he denied having anything to do with the armed robbery in question. Then after speaking with the
prosecutor, I went back to the client and told him the witness/victim had
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said not only was the client the robber but that he had used a .38 caliber
handgun during the robbery. The client's indignant response, "He's lying. It
was a sawed-off." The point is that there is no substitute for experience, nor
is experience enough in itself because many people never manage to learn
from experience and keep making the same mistakes.
In the intense and high-stakes world of effective trial advocacy, skill
helps, resources are useful, and evidence and law are important. But it all
comes down to the lawyer's ability to influence, shape, and persuade the
strange combination of individual and collective judgments made by jurors
who are hearing this particular case involving these facts, parties, and witnesses for the first time. A lawyer can't tell for sure about a case until actually in the midst of the trial process and the members of the jury can be seen
smiling or nodding in agreement when one witness is testifying, but not
when your client or key witness is on the witness stand. Or your client
might be a saint who has the misfortune of looking or sounding like somebody who tortures cuddly little animals. Even then, nothing is certain until it
is done and the verdict has been returned.
There is an irrational element to jury decision making. Losing a case
may be as simple as your key witness speaking in a way this specific jury
does not like. Voir dire is a limited device for selecting jurors and in any
event we tend to focus on jury selection as if it were an individualized process when in fact it depends on the interactive dynamics of small group decision making. Even though another jury might react differently, you have
to deal with the values, prejudices, and attitudes of this jury. Depending on
the side being represented, whether we are dealing with a civil or criminal
case, and the allocation of the burden of proof, the focus is on evaluating the
probability of being able to influence the vote of a specific number of jurors. Only if the advocate is representing the government in a criminal case
is it necessary to achieve small group unanimity.
Even the best lawyers cannot guarantee their clients what a jury will
do. With a jury all we can do is give our best guess or estimate, and quote
percentages and probabilities. The ultimate uncertainty regarding what the
jury's decision will be and the willingness to surrender control to the jury
over what happens provides the force that drives the process of dispute resolution. Large institutions, for example, will do almost anything to avoid
having a case decided by a jury because they know the jury will tend to
come down against them.
This is why such institutions are increasingly writing binding arbitration clauses into employment contracts and consumer agreements. The arbitration provisions typically include the potential for being required to pay a
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defendant's legal fees and costs if you press an unsuccessful claim.' This
not only generates a chilling effect on the willingness to use arbitration, but
given that arbitrators know parties have veto power over selection of arbitrators and that arbitral plaintiffs tend to be "one-shot" users while organizational defendants offer repeated users of arbitration services, the large institutional repeat users of arbitration are likely to be viewed more sympathetically from the perspective of the arbitrators if they want future appointments.
F. Evaluation Principle # 6: Be Realistic About Outcome Probabilities and
Collectability
Part of knowing how you should proceed with a particular strategic
path depends on the amount of risk the client is willing or able to accept. If
a client with a legal problem was dealing with an investment counselor rather than a lawyer, the prospective investor should expect to be asked how
much return is wanted or needed, and what degree of protection or safety
the individual desires in the investment program. The range of investment
options would vary from the most highly speculative and leveraged investments that would bring very significant returns if everything turned out
right, to bank certificates of deposit insured by the federal government.
There would be little risk of loss with the CDs, but the investment return
would be relatively low. With the most speculative investments the investor
runs the risk of losing the entire investment, plus, if the investments are
heavily leveraged, might face disaster if forced to cover the losses. The upside is a big win, but the downside can be catastrophic.
Collectability is one of the most basic questions that must be asked in
evaluating a dispute or potential transaction. Working out the paper value of
a case or the probability of success on the merits is only a preliminary step.
On paper a case could be worth $30 million with a 100 percent probability
of obtaining a verdict in that amount, but if the collectable assets of the opposing party (or limits of insurance coverage) are much lower or even non61.
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existent, the paper represented by the verdict is worthless unless there is
hope for the opposing client improving their financial situation and for the
claim to be of a character not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The good lawyer
seeks to understand the real resource conditions under which opposing clients are operating in order to know not only how hard and long they can
afford to fight, but what resources exist to satisfy judgments. If you cannot
collect the money, the paper value is little more than symbolic.
G. Evaluation Principle # 7: Risk/Benefit Analysis and Cost Assessment
Which path of strategic action is more expensive, and what do we
mean by expense? There are various ways to look at the expense of a strategic path. How do you measure real cost versus apparent cost? The expense
of taking a case to trial is generally much greater in terms of money expended and the time and energy consumed in the process than are the other
strategic paths. The higher expenses are produced both by the added thoroughness and intensity of the preparatory phases required to try a case, and
the effort involved in the trial and appeal.
Questions you need to ask include: How much can your client afford
to pay? How much can your opponent afford to pay? Is the opponent's lawyer obtaining his money up front? If so, what will be left for you and your
client after a long and hotly contested struggle? If the opposing lawyers are
not receiving all their money up front, as opposed to periodic payments, and
it is a non-contingency defense case without a deep-pocket client, then if
you impose significant costs by forcing the action early and the defendant's
attorney is a "hand to mouth" general practitioner, how long will they be
able to carry that client? As the bills for legal fees and expenses mount up,
when will the case's "sticker shock" hit the opposing client?
In determining the true costs of a case, we need to visualize a balance
sheet, revenues on one side and expenses on the other. This requires identifying which path of strategic action creates the greatest outcome potential,
as well as the risks involved in achieving that potential. Taking a case
through trial may, for example, be twice as expensive as negotiation, say
$25,000 versus $12,500. But what if you feel there is a ninety percent probability you can achieve a $300,000 verdict at trial and that you have essentially reached the limits of the defendant's willingness to pay after a defense
offer of $100,000 only a week before trial? Even though the defense may
increase their offer to $125,000 at trial, the most desirable strategic path is
likely to be to try the case because of the differential between your expectation of $300,000 and the defendant's probable offer of $125,000. Part of the
decision turns on the quality of your evaluation of a ninety percent probability of a $300,000 verdict, its collectability, the likelihood of appeal, and the
significant gap between your expectation and the defendant's offer.
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A lawyer is responsible for evaluating the case for the client in terms
of its legal and financial viability, and the unavoidable costs that must be
paid by the client. These costs, and the realistic outcome probability, nearly
always reduce the "face value" or apparent worth of the case. If, for example, there is only a ten percent chance of winning a $50,000 case but the
lawyer will generate $10,000-$13,000 dollars worth of billable hours and
the client must pay an additional $7,000 in expenses, then the client deserves to be told the case is not worth pursuing unless he or she can afford
the expense or it is a matter of principle for which the client is willing to
pay. The equation the client needs to see is (.10 x $50,000 = $5,000) $13,000 - $7,000 = - $15,000 in probable outcome. The considerations also

shift if you are handling the case on a contingent fee basis because, for the
client at least, this reduces the amount they have to pay in attorney fees unless the case is successful. In our example if the $10,000-$13,000 in fees is
converted to one-third of whatever is actually recovered, then the cost to the
plaintiff may or may not shift in absolute terms, but the obligation to pay is
contingent.
Provided with this information many clients would choose to not pursue their claim if an hourly fee was involved. But as the probability of recovery increases to a sixty or seventy percent level, the calculation shifts.
Similarly, so does the probability of a lower, but less expensive, outcome
through settlement. There are differences between the outcome potential of
a negotiated settlement and the outcome potential of a trial. For a negotiator,
the problem is how to keep the opponent uncertain concerning the low outcome probability of your case at trial, so that they will be willing to pay you
$20,000 to settle the case. This is why so much of legal strategy is about
creating false impressions, reinforcing an opponent's expectations, and concealing the weaknesses of your case.
Of course there are numerous variables involved in many law cases,
but civil cases can be looked at as investment vehicles with identifiable
risks, characteristics, and costs of doing business. We need to do a better job
of explaining these factors to our clients. An example of risk and opportunity assessment is provided by a jury verdict against Owens-Corning in which
four plaintiffs sued Owens-Coming for disease caused by their long-term
workplace exposure to asbestos. A New York jury returned a verdict of
$64.65 million. 62 Corporate monetization of others' lives leads to jury out-

62. The case is summarized in a report in the National Law Journal. See Verdicts:
The Big Numbers of 1995: FourAsbestos Plaintiffs are Awarded $64.65 Millionfor Personal
Injury, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 8. The report indicates: "On Dec. 6, 1995, a New York
jury awarded the four plaintiffs one of the largest asbestos awards ever-a total of $64.65
million. The largest share, $22.4 million, went to Mr. Falloon. The other awards were: Mr.
Karasik, $16 million; Mr. DeBerardinis, $15 million; Mr. Pankowitz, $11.2 million." Id
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rage, and the jury, as representatives of the community of ordinary human
beings, then says: "Now we will make you pay for what you did."
The problem with a case such as Owens-Coming and the issue of punitive damages that is frequently the largest element in such jury awards is
that it would be virtually impossible to completely resolve the case short of
trial. Regardless of what he might have hoped, there was no way the plaintiffs' lawyers could have guaranteed or even expected that the jury would
buy into the compensatory and punitive damages themes and analysis. Nor,
prior to the verdict, would the lawyers for Owens-Coming ever seriously
fear that verdict would be rendered or be able to convince Owens-Corning
that its exposure was on that scale.
The competing estimations of settlement ranges in such a case are
simply so far apart there is no overlapping and no real chance of settlement.
Each side is therefore taking an enormous speculative risk. Owens-Coming
itself simply wouldn't be able to deal in those terms or believe a jury was
likely to come back with such an enormous punitive verdict. Defense lawyers will not be able to believe in that possibility until it has not only happened several times at the trial level but been upheld on appeal. Ford Motors has been hit with a series of multi-million dollar jury verdicts for rollover defects in its SUVs.' Such judgments can be expected to eventually
affect Ford's evaluation of its potential exposure in pending cases, as well
as those of other plaintiffs in similar situations. This is because each side
now has a different perspective on what is realistic and possible. Until the
pattern of liability and scale of damages becomes clear, the outcome potentials and probabilities are seen by both sides in such disputes as being so
radically different that pretrial settlement is very unlikely. In such situations, resort to trial is almost inevitable.
Although there are serious abuses by some lawyers that are committed
both consciously and without deliberate intent, most lawyers are simply
trying to do a good job for their clients. The problem is that a lawyer costs a
considerable amount of money, and clients do not see what they do because
much of a lawyer's work is invisible. Few clients understand how much
time good lawyers spend on research, investigation, depositions, and other
forms of discovery, case preparation, etc. in the effort to help solve their
problems and disputes. Sometimes there is no solution to client resentment
even when the lawyer has been completely honest and specific at all stages.
People who themselves have no difficulty charging significant sums for
their own services-mechanics, plumbers, doctors, contractors, business
people-somehow feel entitled to extremely low cost legal representation.
Knowing the likelihood of client resentment of legal fees and expenses, a
63. See cases discussed in Howard Latin and Bobby Kasolas, Bad Designs, Lethal
Profits: The Duty to Protect Other Motorists Against SUV Collision Risks, 82 B. U. L. REV.
1161 (2002).
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lawyer should take care to send clients regular updates of activities, charges,
and expenses, even if operating pursuant to a contingent fee contract.
The full costs of representation, including inevitable and unavoidable
costs, the most probable costs, and the contingent costs that depend on how
the opponent proceeds and which path of strategy is successful should be
specified to the extent possible at the beginning, or as soon as they become
reasonably obvious. Otherwise, a lawyer can expect client complaints to bar
associations and grievance committees as well as loss of "word of mouth"
recommendations and referrals that can be provided by satisfied former
clients.
H. Evaluation Principle # 8: Accounting for the "Fog of War"
The fog of war is a natural human reaction when encountering intense,
dangerous or chaotic situations in which the consequences of success and
failure are high.' Thefog blocks our ability to perceive accurately and timely. This prevents us from making the instantaneous decisions needed to
function well. Stress, fear, emotion, uncertainty, and chaos are generated by
conflict and goal seeking. These emotions and the corresponding tendency
toward over reliance on pre-developed plans of action tend to inhibit our
ability to perceive clearly, and to understand what is happening at an early
enough point where we can defend against others' actions or take positive
actions that advance our strategies.
Thefog of war is a constant consideration and danger for the trial lawyer. A recent example involved a case on which I was consulting. The lawyer had spent two years working on the client's civil dispute and had researched and prepared in great depth. He clearly understood the facts, issues, and nuances. Yet on his opening statement he forgot to present the
client's counterclaim and did nothing to remedy the oversight until a considerably later point in the trial. The judge ruled at that point that his omission had waived the counterclaim and refused to allow any instructions or
argument to the jury based on that claim. The plaintiff in the case had
sought more than $850,000 in damages, and the defendant-client had been
counting on the counterclaim to set off against any recovery.
The plaintiff was in fact an extremely dislikeable person to the extent
that the bailiff later admitted he heard the jury stating how much they disliked her. The outcome was a $20,000 verdict for plaintiff, but the jury also
attempted to render a separate verdict for the client-defendant. The judge
informed the jury that they could not give anything to the defendant due to
the fact that there was no counterclaim before them, and sent the jury back
64. For an intriguing analysis of the derivation of the concept "fog of war," see
Eugenia C. Kiesling, On War: Without the Fog, MIL. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 85, available
at http://www.clausewitz.com/bibl/Kiesling-OnFog.pdf.
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in to finalize the verdict. The defendant was understandably upset with his
lawyer and demanded the return of an $8,000 fee payment he had recently
made and informed the lawyer he would not pay him any fee for the week in
trial. The pressure of trial made an otherwise competent lawyer "choke" at
trial and cost himself and his client a substantial amount of money. This is
thefog of war.
I. Evaluation Principle # 9: Sometimes Settlement is Not Possible
How do you decide whether to attempt to resolve a dispute through
"alternative" means or pursue litigation? Among the key questions responsible advocates must ask are: "What does my client want or need and what
is the best way to achieve an outcome consistent with my client's desires
with the least expenditure of resources?" Diagnose, plan, prepare, evaluate,
reevaluate, and acquire information continuously. This includes various
forms of intelligence gathering, including "spying." Information accessing,
development, distillation, and refining are at the core of effective strategy.
They are also expensive and time consuming.
Well-funded defense strategists approach litigation with the attitude of
imposing significant costs on the opponent through what is called "papering" the case through discovery, investigation, and continual motions that
require responses." This often exhausts plaintiffs' resources and forces lawyers to make choices about how much time and money they can afford to
put into a case. Obviously this is affected by upfront assessments by the
lawyers about the nature of the opponent, the amount that can realistically
be sought, the probabilities and risks relating to achieving a particular outcome, and the costs of the type of case. Cases with significant medical issues projected across multiple clients may offer the appearance of very significant returns over time but can easily become "money pits" in which
large sums are sunk that might never be recovered.
In such cases preparing and deposing the medical experts and related
witnesses may easily run costs into the hundreds of thousands of dollars
long before the end game is reached. One result in many cases depending on
client resources and realistic potential outcome is that some investigation is
not done and some information that might have been critical in determining
65. The history of tobacco litigation offers an example of this strategy. It is argued:
[T]he tobacco companies were also successful in using their size and financial
strength to make litigation as difficult as possible for the plaintiffs. The tobacco industry filed and argued every conceivable motion, took countless depositions, and
sent out extensive interrogatories. As a result, it was extremely burdensome and
expensive for plaintiffs and their attorneys to pursue their cases.
Tobacco-Tobacco Litigation, JRANK.ORG, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1 0805/TobaccoTobacco-Litigation.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
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the outcome never uncovered. In other situations plaintiff-oriented law
firms carefully screen cases prior to agreeing to represent the clients because they are going to have to front the significant costs involved as well
as handle the cases on contingency arrangements that require provision of
their legal services without fee payments in the expectation that they will
gain from the ultimate settlement or jury verdict. If recovery is not made,
the lawyers "eat" large amounts of costs and other expenses and have essentially donated hundreds or thousands of hours of time without compensation.
As business entities, lawyers and law firms cannot be expected to handle such cases without the realistic expectation of return on the investment
required. Sophisticated analyses therefore go into plaintiffs' lawyers' decisions about whether to even accept a complex case on a contingency fee
basis. On one level this is absolutely reasonable. But when lawyers take
such cases anticipating relatively minimal or low-level settlements as being
the norm-not because of the disputes' real value but the lawyers' balancing of the "package" of cases they are handling-they have betrayed the
client unless this has been a clear part of the discussion prior to the agreement for representation.
Consider that in any case there are themes and facts that are critical
determinants. If they are in your favor, then it helps in the process of evaluating the potential outcome and deciding whether to settle or take the case to
trial. If they are against you and you do not have countering or mitigating
themes of substantial power, then it assists in your own evaluation of the
dispute, including what appears to be a good settlement on your client's
behalf. Along with a dispute's "thematic" power there are often specific
facts that may work either for or against you. These are often ones in which
you ask yourself how "real" people would view certain facts and considerations, and whether they would be compassionate, angry, disgusted, or in
some other strong emotional state that helps or hurts your client's interests.
Such considerations do much to shape your evaluation and strategy,
including placing a price tag on a dispute's value whether through settlement or trial. These valuations are different due to the higher risk factors
that are present in trials even if the thematic and factual considerations appear to clearly be on your side. It is when the gap between what is judged to
be the dispute's value in settlement versus the considerably higher valuation
through trial, even after risk and probability discounting, are so far apart
that a trial offers the only realistic mechanism. Look at the following examples and consider the key thematic and factual considerations that appear to
have been in play and that virtually guaranteed that settlement or ADR were
not viable options from the plaintiffs' point of view.
In Warren, Ohio a jury returned a $13.9 million award to a ten-yearold girl and her family in a medical malpractice suit. The child has cerebral
palsy due to a lack of oxygen during delivery, with the claim being that the
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dangerous condition was evident on the monitors during the birthing process but ignored by the obstetrician. The girl's life span is projected to be in
the normal range, meaning that she requires a lengthy lifetime of expensive
medical treatment. The award is the highest ever in the area in such a case,
surpassing an $8.5 million verdict in the wrongful death of a six-year-old
child. A key factor is that the same lawyer represented plaintiffs in both
cases. Key Considerations: a. ten-year-old little girl with another sixty to
seventy years of "normal" life; b. the little girl was in the courtroom and the
jurors could see the consequences; c. defendants presumed to be able to pay
a significant amount; d. brain damage caused by lack of oxygen; e. jurors
could see themselves or their children or loved ones in that kind of a situation; f the monitors showed the problem; g. the doctor ignored the problem;
h. we are told to trust doctors and to place our lives in their hands; i. the
plaintiffs lawyer had won a high verdict in the jurisdiction in a similar case.
In another medical malpractice case in New York City, the pregnant
mother began bleeding during labor, and it was overlooked and not properly
investigated by the delivery room personnel. The bleeding resulted in severe
oxygen deprivation in one of the twins she was in the process of delivering.
There were indications of problems with the first-born infant, but the staff
still did not rush the delivery of the second born twin. The child suffered
severe brain damage. A Brooklyn jury returned a verdict of $47.3 million.
Key Considerations:a. a breach of the trust we put in doctors since we are
at the mercy of their skills; b. the effects of brain damage on our sense of
the quality of life with which the plaintiff is left; c. delay in the medical
staff's actions even though there were already indicators of a problem; d.
our fear of brain damage; e. ability to depict the effects graphically; f sympathy for a mother whose child was needlessly harmed.
The infamous and often criticized McDonald's "hot coffee" case offers another example. It is often used as a way to demonstrate the supposed
irrationality of runaway juries in a litigious society. The problem is that it
was not an irrational jury decision based on a full review of the evidence.
Evidence from McDonald's internal documents revealed what had occurred
represented the classic corporate tradeoff between a known potential for
harm and risk to the user of the Company's product, in this case hot coffee
sold to people in the "platform" of a moving vehicle rather than a stable
restaurant table. The temperature at which McDonald's marketing data indicated the Company's coffee outperformed sales relative to other fast food
chains was substantially higher than the other chains. This provided
McDonalds with a clear sales advantage even though the hotter coffee created a greater risk of serious burns. McDonalds made the decision to allocate the risks of burns to its consumers purchasing coffee through the drivein window option while reaping the higher profits. Key Considerations:a.
McDonald's had been put on notice of other burns caused by its coffee at
drive through service windows; b. the company had already made an inter-
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nal decision that the profit realized from having hotter coffee than its rivals
was worth the risks of being held liable for bums any patrons suffered; c. a
jury would find a ruthless corporate decision-making process that placed
profit above customers' safety to be actionable; d. the members of the jury
could see themselves in the same situation and resent being treated by the
corporation as a faceless cost of doing business in order to enhance profits.
In such a situation it is very difficult if not impossible for the competing lawyers to be on the same page in determining how to proceed and to
evaluate the most important risks and outcome possibilities. If there is a
series of similar cases that shows a trend in one way or another then there is
a frame of reference or benchmark that can be used to evaluate the case.
Otherwise the lawyers are in limbo with no firm guidance.
J. Evaluation Principle # 10: The Psychology of the "Eve of Trial"
Settlement
The large scale trade-offs between multiple cases that require attention
and the demands of full trial preparation and performance in the allocation
of your time is one reason few lawyers actually want to try a case. Unless
they have an extremely wealthy client or are part of a governmental institution that has committed significant resources to the dispute, they do not
have the time or incentive to put other work aside. No matter what they say
during negotiation, most lawyers are still patching their case together on the
eve of trial.
This is why many settlements occur at trial or a little way into trial
when all bluffs have been called and/or lack of adequate preparation catches
up to one or both sides. The lawyers know they are not prepared for more
than an opening statement and perhaps the examination of one or two witnesses, and do not want the embarrassment of being exposed as a professionally inept character. It is also a fact that until they are impaneled a jury
is a hypothetical entity. You hope you can seat one kind of jury but sometimes you cannot get what you want and sense that the jurors as final decision makers in the case are not likely to go in your favor. When this happens cases sometimes settle during trial, but even this is based on assumptions about the particular jury rather than any certainty.
K. Evaluation Principle # 11: Knowing Self and the Decision Makers
If we know others, and observe and understand their strengths and
weaknesses, we can better see and evaluate our own context. This includes
others' perceptions of us, and how they respond to us. No matter how perceptive we are or think we are, everyone is deceived about something at
some time. We are often deceived because we want to be deceived, or at
least want to avoid confronting something unpleasant about ourselves or our
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preferred vision of things. There are many things we want to believe about
ourselves, about the world, and other people. Self-deception is an important
coping mechanism for everyday life. It allows us to blur the harshest edges
of reality. We create illusions to mask reality, to retain our cherished beliefs,
and to make us feel better. The lawyer cannot afford to have illusions because illusions are really delusions. There is a price to pay for the clarity
that is an essential quality of the lawyer's perception, but if you want to be
an effective lawyer it must be paid.
It is not enough to study your opponent in gathering intelligence information. You need to literally put yourself in a state of mind so that you
are able to develop your opponent's strategy. Put yourself in the opposing
lawyer's place, although that is not enough. Acquiring essential strategic
knowledge requires that you master a wide variety of roles and perspectives.
It is almost as if you develop the ability to occupy multiple personalities,
except that you are fully aware of all you are doing and apply the insights
gained to more effective representation of your client. One critical perspective is that you must become your opponent in order to understand the issues
and consequences from that perspective and get beyond your own subjectivity. Not only must you understand self in the sense of strengths and weaknesses, but be able to perceive the motivations and values of key decision
makers. Depending on the type of dispute and the stage at which it is at any
particular moment this can include analyzing the behaviors and motivations
of judges, arbitrators, or jurors. But along with this goes the need to understand the perspectives of opposing clients who are the decision makers who
have to approve settlements. You do not simply prepare your side of a contest, but need to visualize the entire case from the perspective of your adversary. This allows you to see yourself and your weaknesses and strengths in a
different light. This means we must know how the world functions. Then
we put ourselves into the perspectives and frames of reference of our opponents in order to see into the opponent and into ourselves. Ask yourself such
questions as: "What are my opponent's strengths? What would he/she perceive my weaknesses andstrengths to be? How would the opponent evaluate
our side? How is he/she likely to think he/she can best manipulate me and
my client?"
The concept used here includes not only actual legal adversaries, but
potential adversaries and even those who declare themselves to be neutral.
Allies or seeming friends may be using you as a stalking horse. A neutral
posture can be a sham or, even if in good faith when created, only temporary and capable of shifting as the stakes change or deals are cut by you or
your opponents. Potential adversaries can be standing on the sidelines, hoping to step in after you and your opponent have exhausted yourselves. Rather than expend their own resources, they are letting you use up yours.
You need, for example, to be able to see how people of the kind that
will be the ultimate decision makers will evaluate the facts and the witness-
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es. A trial lawyer tends to become too close to the facts and people involved
in a dispute and thus suffers from excessive subjectivity that interferes with
the ability to understand how the decision makers will perceive the dispute.
To overcome the inevitable subjectivity the trial lawyer needs to seek others' impressions, views, and emotional reactions to the facts, themes, and
people of the case. To do this you must develop the ability to become the
decision makers. This requires that you put yourself inside the analytical,
motivational, experiential, and emotional worlds of the people who will
decide the outcome and look at it through their awareness and system of
valuation and choice. When you do this you will know how to adapt your
strategy to present it to those decision makers in a way they will understand
and accept as valid.
Becoming the decision maker does not only involve understanding the
values and perceptions of judges, jurors, or arbitrators. It also includes determining the motivations, expectations, needs, and values of the principals
on the other side of the dispute or opportunity. This is because they will
ultimately decide if there is to be a settlement or a deal of some kind,
whether pre-trial, during trial, or on appeal. It is important to understand
how they will view the terms, and the people. Being aware of what outcomes they fear or the consequences of gain or loss is part of the evaluative
process. Ask yourself if regardless of what they might like to do personally,
do they have a constituency they have to appease, placate, or impress?
Another factor in choosing a path involves the nature of the decision
makers who accept or reject offers in that path. Negotiation, for example,
will often not be the best path for a plaintiff to reach an outcome involving
the highest amount of damages. This is particularly so if the damages are
"soft" and involve pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, punitive damages, projected future medical expenses, and other non-economic damages.
The idea is that these can be driven upward by jury sentiment, indignation,
or outrage at a defendant's callous behavior. In such situations, trial may
offer by far the highest outcome potential for the most severely harmed individuals. But the unpredictability and the sometimes all-or-nothing risk
that many trials involve is a limiting factor. We can think of the distinction
as that of outcome probability contrasted with outcome potential. Probability and risk must be considered in determining a case's true value.
Any case needs to be discounted by a responsible assessment of the
risk factors associated with taking the case all the way through a trial verdict, and subsequent appeal. One way a plaintiffs lawyer can hedge the bet
for the client is to sue multiple defendants when appropriate, and settle with
some of them prior to trial. In that situation, the plaintiff already has a guaranteed win, and can afford to go for broke against the remaining defendants.
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L. Evaluation Principle # 12: Understanding and Using Timing and Rhythm
Each process moves at different speeds and rhythms. Does the lawyer
want a speedy resolution or a lengthy delay? Speed stands not only for the
quickness, but the slowness, of case resolution. Negotiation can resolve a
case in moments, or take years even if being done in good faith. Arbitration
has its own pace and rhythm, more compressed and accelerated than is
found in trials. If a mediator is brought in early in a dispute when the parties
say: "We have a problem and are hitting each other over the head without
getting anywhere. Let's involve a mediator and see if we can get it taken
care of," then it can resolve the situation quickly, or it may not work at all.
On the other hand, good faith negotiation and mediation can be considered
successful if parties learn important things about the case, including whether
settlement is likely. A successful negotiation does not necessarily require a
settlement.
Law cases have predictable cycles and characteristics. The existence
of a rhythm means that each path requires a specific set of behaviors as it
unfolds. If you do not settle a dispute quickly, for example, a different settlement rhythm takes hold. If a plaintiff files pleadings, then negotiation still
takes place, but it is a different kind of negotiation. Litigation negotiation
becomes part of, and is responsive to, the formal rhythms and timing schedules imposed by litigation rules and judicial practices. It is therefore distinct
from non-litigation, primarily transactional negotiation, and pre-litigation
negotiation. The parties will become part of the timing patterns dictated by
the rules rather than being in control of their own timing. When litigation
occurs the process to some extent takes over key aspects of the case. When
the formal rules are invoked the processes of regulated litigation are more in
control of what is happening. This includes creation of the primary pressure
points at which settlement is most likely.
Each strategic path has its internal mechanisms for generating pressure
and costs. There are channels within cases created by the system of informal
and formal dispute resolution that allow for the steady building of pressure
on the disputing parties as they approach the prescribed deadlines and tasks
demanded by the rules of litigation and procedure. As you move along the
formal processes, the channels through which you act become increasingly
narrower. Bottlenecks develop that intensify pressure as they approach and
then decompress the pressure if the parties do not settle. The pressure may
be high at initial stages, low for a significant period afterward, and then
build as the lawyers perform the intermediate tasks of case preparation and
exploratory negotiation against a backdrop of a process that is moving
steadily toward trial or binding arbitration if the parties cannot agree. These
rhythms and pressures are built into the process. But failing to resolve disputes at these points creates a new situation in which added resources have
been expended, capital invested, and in some instances "sunk costs" in-
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curred that up the settlement demands and reduce the probability of a settlement until trial or arbitration occurs.
CONCLUSION

The central premise of this analysis is that far too many clients are being betrayed by their lawyers through the combination of fee abuse, neglect,
and incompetence to the extent that the representation can be a cynical sham
or a professional embarrassment to anyone aware of what has occurred. For
many clients the attempt to obtain quality service from their lawyers is a
kind of con game in which the promises and illusions woven by the obscure
mystery of their lawyers' activities far exceed the results. Nor are there any
effective mechanisms in place to protect clients or that allow them to know
when their lawyers have abused their responsibility of loyalty, trust, and
quality.
It should be clear from the examples presented in this article that lawyers and judges cannot be trusted to "self-regulate." Consider the numerous
situations where I directly observed clearly unprofessional behavior related
to delay, fee churning, grossly negligent acts and failures to act, fraudulent
over-billing, and more. I experienced such conditions, but as a lawyer and
teacher of ethics and strategy, I didn't file a single grievance or ethical
complaint against another lawyer. Nor did I inform opposing clients of what
I considered to be significant breaches on the part of their attorneys that
harmed their interests, both because I was forbidden to do so by ethical
rules against contact with opposing clients and because it was not in my
clients' interests to "provide aid and comfort to the enemy." Along with this
is the fact that the procedures and intensity of conflict with other lawyers
against whom complaints could be made would almost certainly be a drain
on time, energy, and resources as well as a poisoning of relationships with
other lawyers. When we add onto these considerations the failure of judges
who are aware of the behavior of lawyers in cases but do little or nothing to
demand higher levels of professional and ethical performance, it should be
clear that the self-regulation on which the lawyers' system of professionalism and ethics is premised is a non-starter.
Self-regulation is at the core of lawyers' arguments that they should be
trusted with oversight of the behavior of lawyers. The ABA's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct leads off with the assertion that: "The legal profession is largely self-governing. . . . [T]he legal profession is unique in this

respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the
processes of government and law enforcement."' The Model Rules go on to
state: "To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional
66.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PREAMBLE, supra note
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calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation
also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government
domination." 7 In the Preamble's paragraph 12 the conclusion is that: "The
legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities
of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its
regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of
parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar.""
Of course as I have sought to demonstrate, the entire foundation on
which the organized bar rests the edifice of entitlement to self-regulation
and special rules is a self-serving bed of sand having little to do with the
reality of private law practice. My argument is that since lawyers' oaths
professing duty and loyalty on clients' behalf do not work for many lawyers, there is a need for a regulatory system with "teeth." A system is needed that increases the likelihood that lawyers will improve their behavior due
to an enhanced probability of exposure of failures and accountability
whether through loss of the right to practice or compensation awarded to
wronged clients for inadequate legal performance.
As the system now stands, the organized bar's regulatory mechanisms
are ineffective, and legal malpractice standards through which wronged
clients are required to seek redress are too complex and expensive. It is currently impossible to enforce rules on quality of legal services through private litigation at this point due to the cost and complexities of those cases
and the requirement of proving that the lawyers' deficient representation
caused damage. This creates a disincentive among lawyers that allows them
to offer deficient representation with virtually no concern about chances of
personal negative consequences. This insulated system of nonaccountability for lawyers works to deprofessionalize the bar because lawyers can get away with almost anything. The challenge is how do we motivate lawyers toward improved client services and eventually weed out the
worst lawyers through identification.
My argument is that the false system of legal ethics and phony or theoretical lawyer liability is "broken." It cannot be fixed by tinkering with its
apparent rules because the primary flaws have to do with implementation
rather than technical language. The existing system should therefore be
abandoned and a specific statutory system developed for consumers of legal
services. Without such a system there will be no real lawyer ethics practiced
by many attorneys, and clients will continue to be provided ineffective and
overly expensive services without any real remedy.
In fact ethics and professionalism as currently conceived have little to
do with the behavior and operating conditions of lawyers as a business. The
67.
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pretense of an independent self-regulating legal profession simply allows
lawyers to rationalize and justify poor and venal performance and insulate
themselves from accountability. A system involving consumer warranties of
service quality, fraud statutes, fee and expense shifting from clients to lawyers when a client's claim for inadequate service is established, and a minimum in statutory damages if neglect is demonstrated, along with requirements for realistic pre-engagement estimates concerning the likely costs of
representation (at least in some categories of cases) could dramatically influence lawyer behavior.

